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INTRODUCTION
New legal institutions are being formed at an astonishing pace in
1992. From Cambodia to Croatia, from Pretoria to Bogota, in the for-
mer territory of the Soviet Union, and the federation taking shape in
western Europe, the work of constructing new polities proceeds apace.
It would be far too much to say that all of these developments are
proceeding along the lines of our American model; others, of course,
think for themselves. Yet it is clear that many of the ideas embraced by
Americans in the late eighteenth century are finding favor with many,
perhaps most, of the plentiful founders of 1992. Political accountability
of the governors to the governed and government limited by law seem,
for example, to be generally accepted premises of contemporary govern-
mental reform.
The tradition of American law teaching had its origins in precisely
these premises. It seems not unlikely, therefore, that the subject of legal
education will reach the agendas of today's founders as well. This Arti-
cle is therefore written to assist the thinking of those in distant places
who may in 1992 or soon thereafter consider the possible role of law
teaching as a foundation of restrained democratic government.
* Some of this Article appears in a shorter piece prepared especially for English readers. See
Paul D. Carrington, Aftermath, in ESSAYS FOR PATRICK ATIYAH 113 (1991).
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It is indeed the thesis of this Article that law teaching has a role in
democratic governance, but a modest one. In one breath, I wish to affirm
its potential utility and to dispute a recurrent conceit among American
law teachers that our own polity not only should be, but is, significantly
influenced by what law teachers say. Professor Felix Frankfurter cap-
tured the essence of this conceit in 1927 when he wrote: "In the last
analysis, the law is what the lawyers are. And the law and lawyers are
what the law schools make them."1 A comparable thought is expressed
in the recent, comparative work of Patrick Atiyah and Robert Summers,
who appraised law schools as the most important influence on American
legal theory and thus on American legal institutions.2 And the same
conceit underlies many contemporary critiques of American law teach-
ing, whether liberal,3 radical,4 feminist,5 or black6 that assume law teach-
ers to be responsible for the cultural conditions that created them. This
conceit is perhaps but a conventional professional egocentricity reflecting
the normal propensity of professional groups for self-inflation, but it can
mislead. It is a large error, akin to blaming the messenger for the news.
My title employs a metaphor supplied by Edward Lorenz, a founder
of the new science of chaology. 7 Lorenz is a meteorologist who teaches
that long-range weather prophecy is impossible, that vast theoretical hy-
potheses intended for use in weather prediction are probably vain, and
that truth, at least in his field, is more effectively pursued at a lower
altitude of generalization, with humbler pretensions and expectations, for
the reason that the causes of weather are too many and their relation too
complex to admit of prediction except at short range.8
If Lorenz is right about the weather, then weather is like law and
politics: We never know what lies beyond the political horizon. Lorenz
1. RAND JACK & DANA C. JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE
CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS 156 (1989) (quoting a letter from Felix
Frankfurter to "a Mr. Rosenwald regarding lawyers, law schools, and American society" dated May
13, 1927).
2. See PATRICK S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 406-07 (1987).
3. See, eg., Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Future ofLiberal Legal Scholarship,
87 MICH. L. REv. 189 (1988).
4. See, eg., Alfred S. Konefsky & John H. Schlegel, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Histories of
American Law Schools, 95 HARV. L. REv. 833 (1982).
5. See, ag., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAW (1987).
6. See eg., Derrick Bell, Strangers in Academic Paradise: Law Teachers of Color in Still
White Schools, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 385 (1986); Derrick Bell & Richard Delgado, Minority Law Profes.
sors'Lives: The Bell-Delgado Survey, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349 (1989).
7. See generally JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987).
8. Id. at 11-31.
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used his butterfly to make a point that has some application to law and
politics; he describes a Brazilian butterfly that by beating its wings cre-
ates a movement of air that by joining with other currents transforms the
weather in Texas. 9 To predict the Texas weather a month in advance,
one would need to time, among other things, each flap of a Brazilian
butterfly wing weeks in advance. All the computational capacity in the
world (or that could be imagined to exist in the world) could not do that,
and so we are doomed in the effort to change next winter in Texas as we
might wish.
Lorenz does not of course imply that butterflies or men and women
should despair of being useful. His observation should be taken as en-
couragement to men and women, and to any butterflies that read, to do
what they can and not what they cannot. This Zen message seems like
good advice for meteorologists, among others.10 I hold that it is also
applicable to law teaching. If not too much is asked of the activity, it is
socially useful, perhaps as useful as short-term weather forecasting. But
if it pretends too much, its utility becomes doubtful.
I. LAW AND CULTURE
In addressing an audience of persons serving other cultures, I em-
phasize that it is not my purpose to advocate the transplanting of the
customs of American legal education to other countries. American law
teaching is indigenous to this continent," a consequence of the unique
political culture emerging here in the late eighteenth century. There is
little reason to assume that its forms deserve replication elsewhere,
although its aims seem worthy of attention in such precincts as Minsk
and Maastricht.
Law is, of course, everywhere a manifestation of the culture of
which it is a part. That relationship was well understood by those who
shaped American legal institutions in the eighteenth century. In The
Spirit of Laws, the most widely read book of that time on the subject of
9. See Edward Lorenz, Predictability: Does the Flap of a Butterfly's Wings in Brazil Set Off a
Tornado in Texas?, Address to the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 29, 1979).
10. Cf W. TIMOTHY GALLWEY, THE INNER JAME OF TENNIS (1974).
11. It has been widely asserted that American legal education was inspired by the English
model in the person of William Blackstone. Most widely quoted to this effect has been James
Thayer. See James B. Thayer, The Teaching of English Law at Universities, 9 HARV. L. REv. 169
(1895); see also ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 29-64
(1921); James B. Ames, The Vocation of the Law Professor, in LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND
MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS 354 (1913). But see Brainerd Currie, The Materials of Law Study,
3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 331, 346-59 (1950); Charles R. McManis, The History of First Century American
Legal Education: A Revisionist Perspective, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 597 (1981).
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law and politics, 12 Baron Montesquieu argued, against existing belief, for
cultural relativism. He insisted that positive law is good or bad only in
relation to the culture of which it is both product and part. 13 Although
the Baron somewhat inconsistently indulged himself in preferring some
cultures to others (he did not care for despotism), he was prepared to
approve legal institutions in one social and political context (even a little
slavery) that he would disapprove in another.
The Baron's relativism startles few contemporary readers.14 Cul-
tural relativism is a premise of much contemporary American thought,
both for those who embrace it to deny claims to abstract justice,15 and for
those who employ it as a reason for resisting injustice said to surround
us. 16 Admittedly, there is today a renewed impulse to universalism: the
conception of "human rights," i.e., of rights that every civilized nation is
bound to recognize. Human rights could be dismissed by an ardent rela-
tivist as Eurocentric moral imperialism, depending as it does on values
characteristic of cultures having European origins. Nevertheless, despite
this competing tendency to universalize, there are few today who would
dispute the Baron's chief point, that a nation's law must consist with its
culture if it is to be effective. To use a trendy term, law is recognized as
"local knowledge." 17
Thus, most of us would, when thoughtful, acknowledge that
although law can be a means by which its culture responds to stimuli,
adapts, and exercises choice when presented, it is rarely a primary cause
of significant change even in the institutions of the law itself, for these are
at most times only reactive to impulses generated elsewhere in the cul-
ture or coming from an external source. In most times, the interdepen-
dence of social and political relationships creates resistance to change
and increases the likelihood that planned changes will bring unplanned
consequences. The chief exception is for moments of cultural crisis when
all relations are in flux; this seems to be such a moment for much of the
world. At such moments, it may be possible for law to play a larger role.
12. PAUL M. SPURLIN, MONTESQUIEU IN AMERICA, 1760-1801 (2d ed. 1969).
13. CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEu, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. I, ch. 3, paras. 12-14
(Thomas Nugent trans., 6th ed. 1750).
14. For a contemporary treatment of the complexities of cultural relativism, see the work of my
colleague, Stanley Fish, especially Stanley Fish, The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence. in THE
FATE OF LAW (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991). For a fuller treatment, see ALAS-
DAIR C. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988).
15. See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY (1989).
16. See BARBARA H. SMITH, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE (1988); Joseph W. Singer, Should
Lawyers Care About Philosophy?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1752.
17. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHRO-
POLOGY 167 (1983).
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The role of lawyers in administering law is in like manner controlled
by the role of the law within each culture. Few suppose that a shortage
of lawyers could anywhere be supplied by an immigration of profession-
als from another culture because the differences in local knowledge are
too great to admit such transfers. 18 By the same token, those working
within a legal profession are narrowly confined in their culturally derived
roles. They can by an exercise of collective will effect change, but gener-
ally only at a glacial rate and in ways that fit the role of law in their
culture. And law teaching is, in like manner, derivative from the profes-
sional relations of which it is part. Thus, culture controls law teaching
far more than the reverse.
The derivative relation of law to culture has been recently demon-
strated with emphasis by the comparative work of Atiyah and Sum-
mers. 19 They contrast American and English law, which have diverged
greatly since the late eighteenth century, despite similarities derived from
a common language reinforced by the nominal reception in America of
English common law.20 Courts, judges, legislators, and lawyers function
quite differently in relation to one another within the two polities, and
this is so because law performs quite different roles in the quite different
governances of two quite different cultures.
It follows that, in large measure, these cultural differences in legal
institutions are determined by causes other than the law itself: The
world makes the law more than the law makes the world.21 Differences
in the English and American professions are dictated by the reality that
positive law is far more important in America than in England.22
Among the causes for this enlarged role may be the absence of a genuine
aristocracy, the heterogeneity of the population, the unsettling presence
in the formative years of the frontier and its interminable land disputes,
the continental scale of the national enterprise, and a handful of deliber-
ate choices made in the decade following the Revolution. Few decisions
made since 1800 have had a major effect on the deep differences between
18. This is of course not to deny that exceptional persons can make the transition-as many
Germans did in the 1930s. A collection of papers on their influence was presented at the University
of Bonn in September 1991. They will be edited by Professor Marcus Cotter and published in 1992.
19. See ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 2.
20. For a more recent empirical study of the contrasts, see RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN
LAWYERS (1989); RICHARD L. ABEL, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1988).
21. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE 196 (1990).
22. Indeed, it is probably still true, as Felix Frankfurter asserted in the letter quoted supra in
text accompanying note 1: "The great, big fact about American national life which differentiates it
from that of all Western countries (and of course, also, Eastern countries) is the part played in our
affairs by lawyers .... " JACK & JACK, supra note 1, at 156.
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American and English polities that were established in the late eight-
eenth century. This suggests not only that this is a very special moment
in nations setting out in 1992 to establish democratic institutions, but it
also points to the wisdom of building those institutions out of native and
not imported stone, facilitating and not impeding the compromise of con-
flicts in the evolving values of the resident cultures.
II. THE ROLE OF LAW TEACHING IN AMERICAN CULTURE
Among the legal institutions shaped by the culture of which they are
a part are those that train the lawyers who are needed to make demo-
cratic government work. Although the new democracies of 1992 have a
superior opportunity to use law teachers as instruments in the develop-
ment of popular self-government, legal education must for any culture be
mostly an afterthought, shaped in response to other culturally derived
legal institutions.
The degree to which the forms of law teaching are culturally deter-
mined is evident in the contrast between English and American tradi-
tions in legal education.23 That contrast is substantial. Atiyah and
Summers contend that elite American law schools are "the most impor-
tant" legal institutions that compete to influence the American legal tra-
dition, in contrast with English "law schools" that they describe as "least
important. '24 Their assessment is based primarily on the observation
that the literature produced by the American legal academy is often cited
by persons in authority and can therefore be said by the authors to be the
major source of ideas about appropriate legal method, whereas English
academic writing is almost never cited.25
I do not question the authors' comparison. In contrast to the Eng-
lish legal academy, the American legal academy can fairly pretend to
greater status and greater influence on the legal institutions of which it is
a part.26 The traditional attitude of English courts toward English aca-
demic literature has been offensively condescending, 27 an attitude possi-
bly reciprocated in some respects by a monastic self-isolation of the
23. See ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 384.
24. Id. at 407.
25. For a similar assessment, see WILLIAM C. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND THE
RISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT (1982).
26. But not to be compared to the great influence of academicians on the development of the
civil law in Italy after 1200 or in Germany after 1500. At those times and places, law professors
became themselves central features of their legal systems, dominating the weak judiciaries. Indeed,
these men were often so deeply involved in adjudication that education was a secondary activity.
For descriptions, see JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 126 (1967) (describing Italy
after 1200); id. at 199 (describing Germany after 1500).
27. See id. at 96-97.
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academy. 28 The causes of these reciprocal attitudes must lie deep in the
English social psyche, a mystery that I do not presume to penetrate.
American law teachers, in contrast, may influence the legal system
of which they are a part in at least three ways.29 First, they train the
professionals who staff legal institutions, and hence have the opportunity
to influence, among other things, the standards of professional conduct
that their students bring to their public responsibilities.
Some readers may doubt the prospects for such moral education.
Although there may be good reason to doubt the effect of formal moral
education on the private or interpersonal morals or the basic values of
adult students, there is sufficient basis for hope that mature adults tend to
share the standards of professional conduct of those who initiate them
into their professional roles.30 Insofar as American law teachers are pro-
fessional preceptors of their students,31 they enjoy an opportunity for in-
fluence as role models and in their control of the agenda of professional
preparation. This opportunity may carry with it some unwelcome duties.
Second, American law schools provide a pulpit for individual law
teachers, who are now afforded, almost luxuriously, the time and job se-
curity to enable them to serve legal institutions as ministers without port-
folio, bearing obligations only to the common interest as best they can
know it. To the extent that individual law professors exploit this special
opportunity, they may influence the law.
Third, there is the possible influence of legal scholarship. American
legal scholarship has effects, but these may be exaggerated, much as the
rooster may exaggerate his effect on the dawn. Superficially influential
literature generally expresses currents that operate quite independently
of academic expressions. Yet I affirm that even reactive academic writ-
ing can marginally affect law, much as editorial writers and political car-
toonists can affect politics.
28. Dawson describes such a circumstance of mutual disdain in nineteenth-century France. See
id. at 390. If such a withdrawal to the monastery occurred in English law, it may be correcting itself
with the rising academic interest in empirical study of law. See ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 2,
at 399.
29. There are perhaps others. For an illuminating and somewhat different taxonomy of the law
teachers' means of influence, see David R. Barrthizer, Prophets, Priests, and Power Blockers Three
Fundamental Roles of Judges and Legal Scholars in America, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 127 (1988). In
recent years, as gatekeepers to the profession, American law schools have exercised some influence
on the size and demography of the legal profession, and perhaps on the quality of legal services. For
reflections on the tension between the schools' responsibilities for the cost of entry into the profession
and for the quality of services, see Paul D. Carrington, The University Law School and Legal Serv-
ices, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 402 (1978).
30. See generally EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS (1983).
31. Cf Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 247 (1978).
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All these opportunities for influence are themselves the product of
the cultural forces that shaped American legal institutions, including the
law schools. They sometimes compete for institutional resources and for
the commitments of teachers.32 But, before considering each of these
means of influence more fully, I propose to put them in historical and
cultural perspectives.
III. REVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS
American higher education in law was established as a direct conse-
quence of the American Revolution, its form and content entwined in the
post-Revolutionary culture that created the nation's institutions and de-
creed their operative method and theory. The educational aim was to
provide fit leaders for the nation's new legal institutions, 33 an objective
that may be timely in many nations in 1992.
The founding instruments of the American legal tradition-the Dec-
laration of Independence and the Constitution-were written in English
and executed by men, most of whom bore English names. Many had
trained as apprentices in English law as it was administered in colonial
America. A few had trained as lawyers in England. A very few had
attended English universities. But they were united by their commitment
to make a body of public law quite different from what they knew of
England's. They had read William Blackstone but reviled his royalism; 34
they knew the English aristocracy and did not aspire to replicate it.35
32. Therein lie the difficulties ruefully enumerated in Paul D. Carrington, Why Deans Quit,
1987 DUKE L.J 342.
33. Paul D. Carrington, The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education, 31 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 527 (1990); see also McManis, supra note 11, at 610-11.
34. See CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 209 (1924) ("Blackstone by his famous treatise confirmed the ruling classes of England in their
overweening conceit of power and flattered them by expressing entire content with the law and
constitution of England, as they then existed."). Most offensive was his definition of law as a pre-
scription of the "supreme power in a state," a power said by American politicians not to exist. See 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *44. For the reaction of
Revolutionaries, see Julian S. Waterman, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone's Commentaries, 27 Nw.
U. L. REV. 629 (1933); see also 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 77-80 (Robert G. McCloskey ed.,
1967). On the other hand, Americans of the time may well have believed that the idea of separation
of powers that was the centerpiece of their Constitution had English origins; if so, it is likely that
they were misled by Montesquieu, who mistakenly attributed the idea to the English constitution.
See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 13, bk. XI. That Montesquieu misunderstood the eighteenth-cen-
tury English constitution was abundantly demonstrated in WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CON-
STITUTION (1966).
35. Abigail Adams expressed an American assessment of English aristocracy in the time of
George III:
[R]etiring to our own little farm feeding my poultry and improveing my garden has more
charms for my fancy, than residing at the court of Saint James's where I seldom meet with
characters so innofensive as my Hens and chickings, or minds so well improved as my
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Their intention to depart from the English legal tradition was, of course,
cemented by the blood sacrifice of their neighbors and, in some cases,
even their brothers or sons. 36
The American Revolution was if nothing else a rejection of a prem-
ise of monarchical government, that may survive in modern English gov-
ernment re-centered on an omnipotent legislature. Atiyah and Summers
report that the English people:
still think of law as something imposed from above, rather like a com-
mand. Although political power may be as diffused in Britain as it is
in other democracies, it seems to us that, in the English vision of law,
neither law itself nor political sovereignty is conceived of as something
that comes from the people.37
That was, of course, the central complaint voiced in the Declaration of
Independence, 38 a voice whose echo may be heard today in many lands.
The Constitution, most readers know, represented a retreat from at
least some of the assertions of the Declaration. It reflects mistrust of
popular decisionmaking. The founders were apprehensive about the
moral and intellectual capacity of the American people to exercise sover-
eignty.39 Having been warned by Montesquieu, and having observed the
unruliness of fellow citizens, they feared that greed fed by demagoguery
would soon lead to despotism. But, in the end, the Constitution did not
so mistrust the people that it abandoned the idea of popular sovereignty;
rather, the Constitution sought to constrain the popular will, to divide
and weaken it, thereby reducing its dangers. It remains a cardinal tenet
of the American tradition that law is not something imposed or received
garden. Heaven forgive me if I think too hardly of them. I wish they had deserved better
at my Hands.
Letter from Abigail Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 26, 1788), in 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 624, 625 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955). A.Z. Reed had it about right: "The tradition of a
self-perpetuating class... enjoying special privileges was entirely repugnant .... REED, supra note
11, at 37.
36. Cf infra note 182. Only the Civil War, among American wars, entailed a greater loss in
comparison to the population. Several European countries experienced comparable losses of mili-
tary personnel in the years 1914-1945.
37. ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 226. Lord Mansfield had put the matter similarly:
"The supremacy of the British legislature must be compleat, entire, and unconditional .... " JOHN
C. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 217 (1943). Accordingly, Mansfield urged
that America must either submit to the absolute power of Parliament or become independent. For
more of this and other like comments, see id. at 201-20.
38. For a lively and comprehensive treatment of the legal premises of the Revolution, see JOHN
P. REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF
RIGHTS (1986).
39. Perhaps most ardent in this concern was John Adams. See 2 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE
OF THE CONSTrrUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5-6 (photo. re-
print 1971) (1787) ("[F]or the nature of popular government being variable, inconstant, and incapa-
ble of conducting itself, the senate and the nobility, who act with more maturity of deliberation, and
with interests more united, can generally counterpoise the party of the plebeians .... ").
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from above, but comes at least indirectly from the people who are asked
to obey it.4°
Accordingly, the Constitution rejected most features of the unwrit-
ten English constitution of 1688 so extolled by Blackstone. 41 Federalism,
the limitation of the national legislative power to enumerated purposes,
was such a rejection. The separation of the executive power from legisla-
tive control to compel compromise between these branches was another
such rejection. The division of the legislative power to compel frequent
compromise between the houses resembled but did not follow English
practice. The system of concurrent judicial responsibilities and jurisdic-
tions requiring cooperation between levels of sovereignty and between
judicial powers was another departure.
Most important for present purposes was the role created for the
federal judiciary in enforcing this complex scheme of divided responsibil-
ities and authority, a role alien to the English judiciary42 or perhaps to
any other then known.43 Although Edward Coke, among others, had
heralded the idea that the king might be bound by the law,44 Americans
were the first to make this notion operative. This sizeable political role
necessarily followed from the several divisions of power, for these could
not be maintained without an enforcement mechanism. The revolution-
aries thus subjected American politics to law, thereby conferring novel
political responsibilities on American legal institutions.
Moreover, in separating powers and dividing the legislature into
houses substantially equal in power, the founders impeded efforts of
40. The declining rate of participation of Americans in elective politics, and the reduction of
campaigning to competition between television commercials and sound bites may, however, suggest
a weakening of this conviction.
41. It may be that the Declaration of Independence was intended to claim for colonists the
rights of Englishmen as described by Blackstone. See George W. Wickersham, Presentation of
Blackstone Memorial, 10 A.B.A. J. 511, 576 (1924). But see Waterman, supra note 34, at 651.
42. See ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 228. Americans were of course familiar with the
"vague flourishes" of Blackstone on the matter of judicial review. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note
34, at *91. More significance was attached to Coke's dictum in Bonham's Case, Co. Rep. ll8a
(1610), and to his romantic enlargement of the significance of Magna Carta. See Philip B. Kurland,
Magna Carta & Constitutionalism in the United States: "The Noble Lie", in THE GREAT CHARTER:
FOUR ESSAYS ON MAGNA CARTA AND THE HISTORY OF OUR LIBERTY 50 (Samuel Thorne et al.
eds., 1965). For a recent review of the literature, see JACK M. SOSIN, THE ARISTOCRACY OF THE
LONG ROBE: THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICA 7 (1989).
43. A possible exception is the highly political Parliament of Paris as it operated in the decades
preceding the French Revolution. See DAWSON, supra note 26, at 358.
44. In his famous 1608 confrontation with James I, Coke apparently affirmed that the king was
protected by the law. This was regarded by the king as treasonous and Coke appeared on his way to
the Tower had not Robert Cecil intervened and had not Coke humbly sought forgiveness. The story
is told in CATHERINE D. BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE 302-06 (1957). By 1688, it was
clear that the crown was under the protection of Parliament, but there remained no role for the
judiciary in sorting out disputes between the two.
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American lawmakers to achieve coherence in their enactments. No
American legislative system is structurally capable of acting regularly
with the singleness of purpose and coherence often achieved by an om-
nipotent Parliament led by its own executive.45 This cumbersomeness of
formal American lawmaking was deliberately designed in 1787 to fore-
stall implementation of policy gaining momentary acceptance in the cor-
ridors of power. In so assuring the impotence of American legislation,
the revolutionaries created a vacuum often embodied in indeterminate
texts of legislation that would inevitably be occupied by the other two
branches of government. Thus, in this respect as well, the founders quite
consciously assured that American judges should often make decisions
laden with social and political consequence.
In subjecting politics to law, the founders necessarily subjected law
to politics. Who amongst the American people were fit to hold a polit-
ical/judicial office? Not those with social status. Only in Virginia 46 and
South Carolina4 7 was there even a semblance of a social elite who could
have lent to American judicial institutions any status of the kind long
enjoyed by the English judiciary. Although there were perhaps more
than a few pretenders, there was no American aristocracy. It was inevi-
table that the selection of the federal judiciary would quickly become and
remain a political battleground.
The appointment of John Marshall to the Supreme Court was, of
course, a politically contentious act of the outgoing President Adams. It
does not surprise us even today that the successor President was inclined
to remove Marshall and some of his colleagues by impeachment. 48 Mar-
shall's troubles with President Jefferson were but the beginning of a ma-
jor, familiar, but unique feature of our law: political disputation over the
personnel of the judiciary. Only in America, at least among Western
nations, must a lawyer generally be a person of some political attainment
to secure a judicial office. This is, of course, especially true of the judi-
ciaries of many states, partly as a result of the efforts of nineteenth cen-
tury Jacksonians and Populists to secure direct popular election of
judges, but few readers need to be reminded of the politics of federal
judicial appointments, which flourished again in 1991.
45. See ATIVAH & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 400. The authors also suggest that American
legislators and administrators may be relatively less competent than their English counterparts. See
id The absence of party discipline also contributes to this incapacity.
46. See generally RICHARD B. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN JEFFERSON'S VIRGINIA, 1790-
1830 (1964).
47. See 1 CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 109-11 (1908).
48. The story is fully told in RICHARD ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLI-
TICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC (1971); see also GEORGE L. HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON,
FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1815, at 205-45 (1981).
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The politicized nature of our courts dictated a legal method and
theory that elevated substance over form.49 If such courts were to win
and maintain public trust and acceptance for decisions having grave
political consequence, they had to persuade the people to be governed
that they were deciding for reasons that commanded respect if not agree-
ment. Indeed, to be persuasive in justifying the exercise of the judicial
power on the scale conceived by Madison and the other architects of
American government, it would be necessary to explain decisions so that
they could be understood, to rest them insofar as possible on the first
principles or premises of the political scheme, and not on arbitrary selec-
tions among possible interpretations of the available legal texts. Formal-
ism that separates the legitimate exercise of power from the expression of
the social and political values bearing on the decision could not serve the
need of our courts to justify themselves with respect to decisions of polit-
ical importance, however comfortable such formalism might have been
to those familiar with English legal traditions. Moreover, political influ-
ence being a necessary credential for the judicial appointment, it would
be surprising if American judges were inclined, even if they were able, to
justify their decisions in formalist, technocratic, avowedly apolitical
terms. It would even seem to require a reversal of character for elected
judges in American state courts to make a full embrace of the politically
sterile style embraced so heartily by their English brethren.50 Thus, by
the design of the politicized judicial office, the founders of American
courts rendered it unlikely that the formalism becoming the fashion in
England5 ' would be the customary style of American case law. They
made it more likely that what Karl Llewellyn was later to name the
Grand Style52 would be over time the predominant American legal
method, even if formalism might hold sway for a few decades.
This became apparent as soon as the politically embattled Marshall
Court was required to decide cases of political consequence on the basis
of opaque Constitutional texts, which were themselves the products of
49. The Constitutional structure thus cut against the influence of Blackstone and English com-
mon law. For Blackstone, the royalist, the pursuit of self-interest was the source of natural law and
the basis therefore of all English law. For comment, see DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS
SCIENCE OF THE LAW 52-53 (1941). Thus it was that Blackstone's readers were adjured to admire
the common law, and to refrain from changing any part that they did not understand well enough to
admire. Cf EDMUND BURKE, AN APPEAL FROM THE NEW TO THE OLD WHIGS 137 (John M.
Robson ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1962) (1791) ("We ought to understand [the law] according to our mea-
sure; and to venerate where we are not able presently to comprehend.").
50. See DAWSON, supra note 26, at 80-99.
51. Formalism is a troublesome term; I here use it in the manner prescribed by Atiyah and
Summers. See ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 28.
52. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 64-72
(1960).
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intensely contested political compromises. The situation forced Marshall
to lead, for good or ill, toward a legal theory and method that engaged
the Court in the overt consideration of first principles and basic political
values.5 3 The very preservation of the republic demanded a substantive
or "pragmatic instrumentalist" 54 legal theory and method, and Mar-
shall's style answered that demand of reality.
It was in this necessitous circumstance that Marshall invented the
opinion of the Court, i.e., the practice of giving a single opinion as that of
the whole Court.5 5 To gain moral and political stature, his Court often
acted unanimously, 56 with Marshall or a colleague giving a reasoned and
authoritative exposition of the law underlying each decision. Implicit in
this practice was an obligation of all members of the Court not only to
pursue the national common interest, but to maintain institutional coher-
ence in that pursuit, and to sacrifice pride of opinion to institutional,
national, or community need. The professional morality embodied in the
practice of delivering a single opinion for the whole Court visibly differed
from that of the English judiciary of the time, who were entrenched in
the custom of seriatim expression of their individual views, a custom that
disavowed shared responsibility.
The effectiveness of the opinion of the Court as an instrument en-
hancing the political weight of the judiciary was recognized at once, with
hostility by Thomas Jefferson, 57 with appreciation by his close ally James
53. On the relation between the American constitutional scheme and legal method, see LON L.
FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940). See also Lon L. Fuller et al., Jurisprudence, 13
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 149, 152 (1965).
54. This is the term applied in ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN
LEGAL THEORY (1982), to describe an approach to legal theory that subsumes but antedates and
survives Legal Realism. Summers describes it as "our only indigenous general theory of law." Id at
35. For a fuller account of the development of American instrumentalism in the post-Revolution
period, see MORTON J. Hoawrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977).
55. The first appearance of the opinion of the court came in the first decision rendered after the
appointment of Marshall. The story is told in HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 48, at 382-89.
There was a precedent for such a device in the opinions of the Privy Council giving advice to the
crown, but the Council was not primarily a judicial institution, at least until the Privy Council
Appeals Act of 1832 and the Judicial Committee Act of 1833. F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 462-63 (1908); see Judicial Committee Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, ch.
41 (Eng.); Privy Council Appeals Act, 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, ch. 92 (Eng.) (repealed). See generally
John P. Dawson, The Privy Council and Private Law in the Tudor and Stuart Period: II, 48 MICH.
L. Rav. 627 (1950).
56. The Court was not so unanimous as may appear. It was the tradition of the Court in those
years of fragility to suppress dissent. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CUL-
TURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 186 (1988).
57. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to W. Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), in 10 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 222, 223-25 (Paul Ford ed., 1899).
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Madison, 58 and with the admiration of emulators in the courts of every
American state. Indeed, it was the development of this institution that
confirmed for most Americans the belief that a single opinion of a court
is itself a source of law,59 a belief not then held in England6° or on the
Continent, where judicial opinions were not then considered to be au-
thoritative legal texts, but mere signs of what might be the omnipresent
law.
This belief in the importance of judicial opinions in turn created a
market for reliable reportage that seems not to have existed except in
America. Official reporters of judicial decisions were in place in most
American jurisdictions in 1815, decades before such a function was
known to England,61 France,62 or Germany.63
The compelling need of the American judiciary to reassure its public
also indicated the use of the broadest possible range of authoritative
materials. As Thurman Arnold explained, American judges needed and
sought the appearance of learning as a substitute for red robes and
wigs.64 Classical learning, including Roman law, was often advanced to
justify judicial action.65 No doubt, especially in the formative decades,
this broader learning was more than a costume and sometimes structured
the thinking of American judges.
In addition to shaping the legal method and literary style of the
courts, the American scheme of government also sustained the develop-
ment of a legal profession bearing the stamp of these politicized courts.
58. Great was the difference between the views of Madison and Jefferson toward the role of
American judges. See, eg., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 27, 1823), in 3
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 326-27 (1865). Thus, although Madison
joined Jefferson in his negative reaction to McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)
(taking expansive view of power of Congress to provide for the general welfare), it was on quite
contrary grounds, including the use of the opinion of the court in a case that Madison regarded as
better suited to seriatim treatment. See DREW R. McCoy, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES
MADISON AND THE REPUBLICAN LEGACY 99-100 (1989).
59. See Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to
1850, 3 Am. J. LEGAL HIsT. 28 (1959). This is not to say that this theoretical issue was easily or
fully settled in America.
60. See DAWSON, supra note 26, at 78; SIR CARLETON K. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 207
(1958).
61. An official reporter was not appointed in England until 1865. DAWSON, supra note 26, at
82; see also John H. Baker, Records, Reports and the Origins of Case-Law in England, in JUDICIAL
RECORDS, LAW REPORTS, AND THE GROWTH OF CASE LAW 15 (1989) [hereinafter JUDICIAL
RECORDS].
62. French case law was made regularly accessible by private reporters in the 1830s. DAWSON,
supra note 26, at 402; see also Main Wijffels, Legal Records and Reports in the Great Council of
Malines (15th to 18th Centuries), in JUDICIAL RECORDS, supra note 61, at 181.
63. Regular annual reports commenced in Prussia in 1847. DAWSON, supra note 26, at 438.
64. See THURMAN K. ARNOLD, FAIR FIGHTS AND FOUL 252 (1965).
65. ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 72-78 (1984).
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Given the nature and importance of decisions being made in American
courts, it was all but certain that the officers of those courts would be-
come a political elite, as Tocqueville soon observed them to be.66 It was
a related event that all but two of the men elected President of the United
States from 1796 to 1868 were lawyers.67 It was not unrelated that many
men of American letters were also lawyers. 68
Not least of the consequences of the Constitution for the legal pro-
fession in America has been the right to jury trial. In creating in the
Constitution such a politically powerful judiciary, the founders evoked a
popular outcry. To secure ratification of the Constitution, it was neces-
sary to set in constitutional cement the right to a jury in civil as well as
criminal proceedings in federal courts.69 This represented yet another
division of power, this one within the judicial branch between the profes-
sional judge and the lay jury, each having their assigned roles, the pur-
pose being to limit the awesome political power of the federal judge.
In significant respects, the civil jury is no longer the same institution
as that established two centuries ago.70 But the civil jury was an institu-
tion quickly entrenched within the American legal tradition as a means
of diffusing responsibility and gaining popular support for the making of
many public decisions.71 This institution contributes directly to the sub-
stantive, non-formalistic character of American law.72 It has also
powerfully shaped the personae of the American bar. Jury argument, or
in some minds jury demagoguery, is for most laypersons and many pro-
fessionals the paradigm of American law practice. 73 It also dictates the
main outlines of civil procedure, including, for example, the discovery
rules designed to enable counsel to prevent surprise at dramatic trials. In
so shaping the bar and the courts, the right to jury trial has also materi-
ally affected thinking about legal method and theory. The law of torts is
in important respects an outgrowth of the civil jury.
66. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 296-300 (Henry Reeve trans.,
1904).
67. Generals Benjamin Harrison and Zachary Taylor were the exceptions.
68. See generally FERGUSON, supra note 65.
69. The right to jury trial in criminal cases is assured by the Sixth Amendment, see U.S.
CONsT. amend. VI; in civil cases, by the Seventh Amendment, see id. amend. VII. For expression of
the views of those opposing ratification, see THE ANTiFEDERALISTS 49-51 (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed.,
1966).
70. See Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 33.
71. On the role of the American jury in deciding questions of law arising in civil litigation, see
id. at 43-47.
72. See ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 174-77.
73. See generally Carrington, supra note 70, at 67-71.
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Almost as an afterthought to these many portentous decisions, the
revolutionary generation established the precursors to American univer-
sity law schools. Law teaching in America was a response to the fear
that the Revolution would dissolve into disorder and despotism, the same
fear that gave rise to the Constitution. A republic could stand only as
long as the people maintained a measure of mutual trust. This appeared
to require, at the very least, leadership that would merit general public
trust. To win such trust, it was believed, the legal and political elite
would need to pursue the classical republican virtue of making and sup-
porting public decisions based on selfless concern for the interests of all.
Divisions of power alone, the founders recognized, would not suffice if
the leaders.were ideologues or demagogues unsuited to compromise and
accommodation of competing values, or unable to articulate the first
principles by which claims of right might be evaluated by their fellow
citizens.
Montesquieu had emphasized the special need of a republic for edu-
cation,74 presumably conducted by the republican family, 75 that would
inculcate this morality of civic virtue in all republican citizens. It was
Jefferson's contribution to suggest that such moral education could be
reinforced if not provided in the existing American colleges. It was his
hope, shared by many others (including even Jefferson's political adver-
sary, Alexander Hamilton, and Hamilton's academic ally, James Kent 76)
that a legal and political elite, if not the people at large, could be social-
ized to a sense of shared public responsibility and trained to persist in the
attempt at disinterested analysis of public issues. The goal of law teach-
ing was therefore to create a class of public men fit to occupy judicial and
other high office, who would gain the trust of all the governed. Their
claim to status would derive not from technocratic competence, income,
or social status, but from their morality with respect to public affairs.
Such an elite as that envisioned appears to have had no particular Eng-
lish origins; if there was a foreign model, it was in the traditions of the
Roman jurists who advised Roman courts and lent intellectual authority
to Roman legal institutions77 and whose work was well known to Jeffer-
son and many other Revolutionaries, almost all of whom were trained in
74. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 13, bk. V, chs. 2-5.
75. See id. bk. IV, ch. 1, § 1; id. ch. 5, §§ 5-7.
76. See Kent's Introductory Lecture, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 338 (1903). The lectures were
delivered in 1796.
77. See DAWSON, supra note 26, at 109-11. Comparison could also be made to the ghulams,
the elaborately educated slaves who served the Ottoman Sultans. For a brief description, see Vernon
J. Parry, Elite Elements in the Ottoman Empire, in GOVERNING ELITES: STUDIES IN TRAINING
AND SELECTION 68-72 (Rupert Wilkinson ed., 1969).
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the classics. 78 But those jurisconsults performed the more limited role of
stabilizing private law; the American innovation was to confer a substan-
tial public a role on such a profession.
IV. ACHIEVEMENTS OF TEACHING REPUBLICAN MORALITY
American colleges were, then, called to validate the status of this
elite by teaching them public law.79 Academic law teaching was initially
undertaken to effect moral education-to transmit republican virtue to
democratic leaders. Early law teachers were thus prophets of democ-
racy.80 Moral education, the first of the three means of public influence
of law teachers, was primary. The roles of the law teacher as public per-
son and as scholar/author were distinctly secondary.
American colleges, then as now, were part of an academic tradition
or system quite apart from law, but like it, integral to the culture. They
were not ill-suited to the task of moral education. Indeed, they were
actively engaged as a primary mission in preparing young men for the
clergy, and it was perhaps a modest step for them to train a secular
clergy, the priests of public virtue who would protect the electorate from
the selfish and destructive factional bickering to which it would be prone.
The role proved no less attractive to fledgling public colleges that were
striving to justify a claim on the public purse. William and Mary, an
Anglican institution, was the first college to assume this role, doing so in
1779 at the command of Governor Jefferson. It appointed as "Professor
of Law and Police" the Governor's mentor in law, George Wythe, a
signer of the Declaration. William and Mary was soon followed by most
American colleges.81 For the first century, law teaching in American
colleges, with rare exception,8 2 had as its clear aim preparation for public
leadership deserving of public trust. Most of the teaching was performed
by men of Some public attainment; many of them were judges, and sev-
eral of those had distinguished public careers apart from their work as
law teachers. For example, Wythe was a judge and concluded his career
78. George Wythe, the first law professor, was recognized as the American most learned in
Roman law. WILLIAM WIRT, SKETCHES OF THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF PATRICK HENRY 43
(1850).
79. Carrington, supra note 33, at 532.
80. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 177-83 (1981).
81. Including Yale, Princeton, Pennsylvania, Columbia, North Carolina, Brown, and
Dartmouth in the eighteenth century, and Maryland, Dickinson, Transylvania, Georgia, Middle-
bury, and Vermont in the early years of the nineteenth century before the War of 1812.
82. Before the appointment of Joseph Story, the Harvard Law School was one. See ARTHUR E.
SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 43-91 (1967).
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as Chancellor of Virginia.8 3 His successor at William and Mary, St.
George Tucker, was also a sitting judge who concluded his career as a
member of the highest court of the Commonwealth. 84 Professor James
Kent of Columbia was Chief Justice and then Chancellor of New York.85
The first law professor at the University of Pennsylvania was Justice
James Wilson of the U.S. Supreme Court.s6 The first professor of law at
Harvard was a member of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts87 and was succeeded by Justice Story.88 Perhaps the professionally
least-experienced young man appointed to teach law in an American col-
lege in the first century was Henry Clay, who soon went on to pursue
perhaps the most significant American political career of the first half of
the nineteenth century;8 9 he was succeeded by a series of judge-profes-
sors, including George Robertson, the Chief Justice of Kentucky. 90 Sev-
eral of the most distinguished college presidents of the antebellum era
personally undertook to provide instruction in law; some of them, such
as Ezra Stiles of Yale91 and Samuel Stanhope Smith of Princeton,92 were
in fact clergymen who studied the Constitution and public law to enable
themselves to contribute to the public morality of the nation.93 The line
between professional training and general education was seldom clearly
drawn; the classics, Shakespeare,94 and political economy were also seen
83. For biographies, see IMOGENE E. BROWN, AMERICAN ARISTIDES: A BIOGRAPHY OF
GEORGE WYTHE (1981); ALONZO T. DILL, GEORGE WYTHE: TEACHER OF LIBERTY (1979).
84. For a full biography, see MARY H. COLEMAN, ST. GEORGE TUCKER: CITIZEN OF No
MEAN CITY (1938); see also William H. Bryson, The Tuckers, in LEGAL EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA
600 (William H. Bryson ed., 1982) (diagram of a family tree).
85. His biography is found in JOHN T. HORTON, JAMES KENT, A STUDY IN CONSERVATISM
1763-1847 (1939).
86. There appears to be no full biography of Wilson; his life is summarized in Robert G. Mc-
Closkey, Introduction to I THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 34, at 8.
87. Isaac Parker is described in SUTHERLAND, supra note 82, at 47-54.
88. Story's biography is R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY
(1985).
89. A recent account and evaluation is MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE GREAT TRIUMVIRATE
(1987).
90. For a biography of Robertson, see Samuel M. Wilson, George Robertson, in 4 GREAT
AMERICAN LAwYERs 365-406 (William D. Lewis ed., 1908).
91. For an excellent biography, see EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE GENTLE PURITAN, A LIFE OF
EZRA STILES 1727-1795 (1962). For a brief account of his role as law teacher, see I WARREN, supra
note 47, at 165-69.
92. See MARK A. NOLL, PRINCETON AND THE REPUBLIC 1768-1822, at 99-183 (1989).
Smith's lectures were published. See SAMUEL S. SMITH, THE LECTURES, COLLECTED AND IM-
PROVED, WHICH HAVE BEEN DELIVERED FOR A SERIES OF YEARS IN THE COLLEGE OF NEW
JERSEY ON THE SUBJECT OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1812).
93. E.g., Stiles and Woolsey at Yale, Smith at Princeton, Nisbet at Dickinson, Holly at Transyl-
vania, Wayland at Brown, Swain at North Carolina, Cooper at South Carolina, and Bishop at
Miami.
94. Francis Lieber observed that American lawyers were blessed in their access to Shakespeare:
"A public man cannot read him too much." 2 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS
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as part of a young man's preparation for public life. Only Harvard and
Yale referred to their law programs as independent "law schools."
Early American law students were often required by their teachers
to develop forensic competence by means of class participation. The
literature assigned them to read often included Blackstone, but generally
in an American edition, which might have been that of Professor St.
George Tucker who elided Blackstone's royalisms and provided his own
insights into American public law.95 In time, Blackstone was generally
replaced by Kent, whose work as judge and writer diminished the influ-
ence of the English law of property in America. 96 Primary emphasis was
given to the study of American constitutional law, The Federalist often
serving as a basic text. All Princeton students, and perhaps others, were
for a time required to memorize and recite the text of the Constitution. 97
Often included in the curriculum were International Law, Comparative
Law, and Political Economy. Only a few of the small number of law
teachers from the era between the Revolution and the Civil War wrote
other than as judges, but the works of David Hoffman,98 Thomas
Cooper,99 James Kent, and Francis Lieber'0° are impressive for their in-
tellectual breadth. Hoffman's elaborate and widely acclaimed outline for
law study10 1 confirms the aspiration of those training this political elite to
give their students the broadest possible intellectual experience in order
292 (Theodore D. Woolsey ed., 2d ed. 1875). Abraham Lincoln agreed, claiming to have read Mac-
beth "as frequently as any unprofessional reader." JOHN J. DUFF, A. LINCOLN: PRAIRIE LAVYER
11 (1960).
95. Tucker's edition was published in 1803. For a contemporary review, see WHITE, supra note
56, at 81-87.
96. See JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1826). But Kent was scarcely an
Anglophobe and in fields other than property, he was prone to adopt English precedent: "Though
the guns along Niagara might boom their defiance of England, they failed to drown the voices of the
English judges who from Bracton to Mansfield were speaking all the while through the mouth of
Kent .... " HORTON, supra note 85, at 196. On matters of public law, his court early invalidated
democratic legislation adversely affecting property tights. Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. Rep. 477,
500 (1811). By such decisions, Kent earned a reputation for both great professional ability and
stubborn political reaction.
97. 2 SMrrn, supra note 92, at 392.
98. See DAVID HOFFMAN, LEGAL OUTLINES (1836); Thomas L. Shaffer, David Hoffman's Law
School Lectures 1822-1833, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 127 (1982).
99. Cooper was perhaps at his best as an editor, producing American editions of works in
Chemistry, Political Economy, and Roman Law, translating major works from German, French,
and Latin. See generally DUMAS MALONE, THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THOMAS COOPER, 1783-1839
(1926). Jefferson described him before he went to South Carolina as the "greatest mind in America."
Id. at 237.
100. See, eg., FRANCIS LIEBER, CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF GOVERNMENT (1854); FRANCIS
LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS (1839) [hereinafter HERMENEUTICS]; 2 LIEBER,
supra note 94.
101. DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND THE
PROFESSION GENERALLY (1836). Foir the acclaim, see Joseph Story, Book Review, N. AM. REV.,
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to enhance their receptivity and their capacity for making public deci-
sions. The patterns of legal education thus tracked the Grand Style
adopted by the judiciary.
The early institutions of higher education in law were few and small.
In the 1840s, a major American university (above four hundred stu-
dents), with among the largest enrollments in its law department (sixty)
and the largest law faculty (three) was Transylvania University in Lex-
ington, Kentucky. 0 2 This institution, in many ways a reflection of its
trustee and former professor, Henry Clay, enjoyed significant if now for-
gotten prominence. It was the flagship of the American colleges' efforts
to train a legal and political elite to lead the exercise of popular sover-
eignty and prevent its tendency to excess.
By graduating as many as thirty U.S. Senators, Transylvania may
have provided Clay with an extra personal bond to political adversaries
that enabled him to assemble the great compromises of 1820, 1833, and
1850, which prevented the premature collapse of the federal union.
Three of its teachers (not including Clay) were authoritatively identified
in 1908 as among the seventy-seven "Great American Lawyers" whose
lives were worthy of biography. ' 0 3 What Transylvania sought to do, and
may have succeeded in doing by its teaching, was to impart to students
headed for public careers a moral tone and a commitment to the national
interest. It is even possible that Transylvania's success in this endeavor
provided the margin of public dedication that enabled the nation to
survive.
This is so because nationhood was a fragile condition. As late as
1832, John Marshall expressed amazement that the nation had lasted as
long as it had.'04 First the West'05 and then New England 0 6 had flirted
Nov., 1817, at 76, reprinted in WILLIAM W. STORY, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY
66 (1856).
102. See ROBERT PETER, TRANSYLVANIA UNIVERSITY: ITS ORIGIN, RISE, DECLINE AND
FALL 168-70 (1896); see also REED, supra note 11, at 451. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Teach-
ing Law and Virtue at Transylvania University: The George Wythe Tradition in the Antebellum
Years, 41 MERCER L. REV. 673 (1990).
103. See 2 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 90, at 221 (John Boyle); 4 id. at 365
(George Robertson); id. at 299 (Thomas Marshall).
104. See Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Oct. 22, 1832) ("[The] union has been
prolonged thus far by miracles."), in Letters of Chief Justice John Marshall to Timothy Pickering and
Joseph Story, 14 PROC. MASS. HIST. Soc'Y 320, 352 (2d ed. 1900).
105. Western dissatisfactions with the union vanished as the first generation of settlers were
replaced by their children, who were the first generation born as Americans, and as statehood came.
But in the earliest years, the West suspected the East of not defending with sufficient ardor the right
to navigate the Mississippi. The region was extremely isolated until the advent of the canals, begin-
ning about 1815. See GEORGE R. TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION, 1815-1860
(Henry David et al. eds., 1951). Kentucky was the first state, in 1798, to suggest the interposition of
state sovereignty against the federal government, when its legislature in 1798 declared the Alien and
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with disunion. Those with Clay who wrought the Compromise of 1820
were faced with the reality that failure would have resulted in a disunion
that no one would risk life or property to prevent.10 7 There would have
been two nations approximately equal in wealth and population, one
slave and one free. When at last disunion was attempted in 1861, there
were many then willing to take mortal risks to prevent it; something im-
portant had happened in the meanwhile.
Even in 1861, after the North had become a much wealthier and
more populous area than the South, successful disunion was a very near
thing. Here and there, for want of a nail, the southern cotton-slavery
culture lost its war for survival.108 If disunion had come in 1850, the will
and capacity to resist would have been less, and the outcome could easily
have been otherwise. °9 Thus, Clay's Compromise of 1850 may have
been pivotal not only in saving the union for another decade, but saving
it at all, and in bringing slavery to an end. That Compromise was itself
also a very near thing, regarded at the time as an almost miraculous
achievement of the aging Clay.110 We will never know how to measure
the role played by law teachers at Transylvania in nurturing the commit-
ment to American law and institutions of those numerous Transylvania
Sedition Act unconstitutional. See the Kentucky and Virginia Resolves approved by two state legisla-
tures in that year. See JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS
169 (1951). At the time of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, it was widely supposed that a new nation
should be formed in the West, perhaps with the cooperation of Spain. On relations of early Ken-
tuckians with Spanish Ambassador Gardoqui, see JOHN M. BROwN, THE POLITICAL BEGINNINGS
OF KENTUCKY 124-56 (1889). Aaron Burr came West to exploit that sentiment and attempted to
establish the Republic of West Florida, leading in due course to his trial for treason. For an account
of the time, see WILLIAM PLUMER, MEMORANDUM OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES
SENATE, 1803-1807, at 548 (Everett S. Brown ed., 1923).
106. The Hartford Convention of 1814 was essentially a protest against "Mr. Madison's War,"
which was a commercial disaster for New England. There was antecedent talk of disunion and the
Convention did align the Federalist Party with the Jeffersonian Resolutions of 1798 in approving the
notion of "interposition," and it was long held against Daniel Webster that his relation to the event
manifested disloyalty to the union. The story is briefly told in PETERSON, supra note 89, at 42-44.
For a fuller account, see 1 GEORGE T. CURTIS, LIFE OF DANIEL WEBSTER 134-35 & n.1 (1893).
107. See WILLIAM PLUMER, JR., THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
1820-1825 (Everett S. Brown ed., 1926); GLOVER MOORE, THE MISSOURI CONTROVERSY, 1819-
1821 (1953).
108. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 858
(1988). The clearest example came at Antietam when, on September 13, 1862, two Union soldiers
found a copy of General Lee's order of battle wrapped around three cigars. It is unlikely that Gen-
eral McClellan would have joined battle but for that advantage. Had he failed to do so, Lee would
have taken Baltimore or Philadelphia, and the war might well have been concluded in favor of the
Confederacy. Id. at 537.
109. See HOLMAN HAMILTON, PROLOGUE TO CONFLICT: THE CRISIS AND COMPROMISE OF
1850 (1964); THELMA JENNINGS, THE NASHVILLE CONVENTION: SOUTHERN MOVEMENT FOR
UNITY, 1848-1851 (1980).
110. The story is briefly told in PETERSON, supra note 89, at 455-62.
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alumni who supported Clay's miracle. We can only say that whatever
Transylvania achieved was the product of its teaching, not its
scholarship.
Transylvania was an offspring of William and Mary, a posthumous
grandchild of George Wythe. Wythe could safely be said to have had the
most important teaching career since Socrates. Before his academic ap-
pointment, he had tutored young Jefferson, becoming his "second fa-
ther." Among his first students at William and Mary was John
Marshall.11  After he left the professorship, Wythe tutored Henry Clay,
acquiring a grandparental relationship to him. Others of the 200 or so
students he taught served in high office, and several founded the Transyl-
vania Law Department. Wythe had been trained in the classics by his
Quaker mother, and was thereafter self-educated in law and politics,
mastering Roman law and the literature of England, France, Germany,
and Italy. As a lawyer, it was said that "no dirty coin even got to the
bottom of George Wythe's pocket." 112 As a judge, he was compared
with Aristides or with an angel, so great was his reputation for disinter-
estedness.11 3 He was in these respects exceptionally well qualified to pro-
vide training in republican virtue. By his fruits one would suppose that
he did that well. In this respect, as a teacher, his influence on American
law and politics was as great as any person's will ever be.
The tradition of American legal education established by George
Wythe abides. Although Wythe himself left behind meager writings, 1 4
an articulation of the political premises of such teachers in revolutionary
times can be found in the writings of Hugh Henry Brackenridge, a Jeffer-
sonian, the founder of the University of Pittsburgh, and a Justice of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania," 5 whose popular novel, Modern Chiv-
alry, sought to emphasize the need of a democratic polity for the services
111. Wythe was less close to Marshall, but a decade after Marshall's student days, Chancellor
Wythe declared unconstitutional an enactment of his former student sitting as a member of the
Virginia legislature, thus providing a model for Marshall's own later decision in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782).
112. BROWN, supra note 83, at 35.
113. John Randolph said of Wythe that "he lived in the world without being of the world;... he
was a mere incarnation ofjustice-his judgments were all as between A and B; for he knew nobody;
but went into court as Astaea was supposed to come down from heaven, exempt from all human
bias." 1 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 90, at 275.
114. For one of the few, see GEORGE WYTHE, DECISIONS OF CASES IN VIRGINIA BY THE HIGH
COURT OF CHANCERY, WITH REMARKS UPON DECREES BY THE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSING
SOME OF THOSE DECISIONS (1795).
115. Brackenridge was brought from Scotland to Pennsylvania as a child in 1753. A Princeton
classmate of James Madison, he was a Presbyterian chaplain in Washington's army. He thereafter
trained as a lawyer, moved to Pittsburgh when it was the merest village, campaigned as a Jefferso-
nian, wrote his novel serially, and served on the state Supreme Court. His biography is found in
CLAUDE M. NEWLIN, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF HUGH HENRY BRACKENRIDGE (1932).
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of men educated to public responsibility. 116 Wythe's teaching aims and
those of his followers were, however, not clearly and fully stated until the
1837-1838 work of Francis Lieber, then of the University of South Caro-
lina.1 17 In short, Lieber extolled reasoned disinterest and willingness to
engage in mutual sacrifice or compromise to save the integrity of the
polity. Although no law teachers today would adhere to the whole of
Lieber's teachings, it is still an important if seldom stated aim of Ameri-
can university law teaching to train students for public responsibilities in
a democracy. This is evidenced in casebooks or the "cases and materi-
als" that invite the balanced assessment of competing interests each
claiming an entitlement to public concern, and in the traditional class-
room discussion designed to prod most students to active engagement in
disinterested or balanced discussion of significant disputes.
V. TEACHING VIRTUE: TRAVAILS OF Two CENTURIES
Undeniably, the aim of teaching republican virtue has been bruised
and crowded over the two centuries of the American experience, but gen-
erally by causes that have been external to the institutions of legal educa-
tion, and indeed even external to America. I here note four difficulties
encountered along the way by those who would teach law as a means to
the public morality needed to sustain democratic institutions. Each of
the four reflects influences set in motion on the far side of the Atlantic.
A. The French Revolution
One powerful influence on American legal institutions in the eight-
eenth century, as it is on events in Eastern Europe in 1992, is the explo-
sive cultural force released in France. The barbarism and genocide that
followed the French Revolution l" 8 confirmed the worst fears of the revo-
lutionaries regarding the disintegrative tendency of republican govern-
ment' 1 9 that had given rise to the establishment of legal education. In
116. See HUGH H. BRACKENRIDGE, MODERN CHIVALRY 392 (1937) ("But of all things under
heaven, the most contemptible and the least sufferable is that of incompetency to a trust and the
aspiring to a place for which the candidate is unqualified."); see also id. at 19:
There is in every government a patrician class against whom the spirit of the multitude
naturally militates; and hence a perpetual war, the aristocrats endeavoring to detrude the
people and the people contending to detrude themselves. And it is right it should be so, for
by this fermentation, the spirit of democracy is kept alive.
117. See LIEBER, supra note 94; HERMENEUTICS, supra note 100. The first edition of the latter
work appeared serially in 1837 in The American Jurist.
118. See SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 786-92
(1989) (elaborating these horrors, including the systematic poisoning of wells in the Vendee region
by the revolutionary "government").
119. American reaction to that event was not far different from that of Edmund Burke. See
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1790).
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this respect, the mayhem underscored the need that law teaching was
intended to meet.
At the same time, it was sometimes thought that the event served as
a model for the widespread disorder that infected American colleges in
the early years of the nineteenth century; Princeton, for example, was
seized by "Jacobinic" students in 1800, and in 1807 the college expelled
seventy of its 125 students for riotous conduct. 120 Endemic disorder
broke into riot at Harvard in 1791 when the Board of Overseers dared to
subject the students to a public examination; it resulted in the rustication
of numerous students, 121 and in 1834, Harvard called in a grand jury,
indicted some of its students and dismissed the entire sophomore class
for a year.122 President Caldwell of North Carolina was admired by the
trustees for his physical strength and foot-speed that enabled him to con-
trol unruly students. 23 The student disorders in America in 1964-1972
were generally tame in comparison to those of "Jacobinical" times.
Those earlier disorders weakened the already fragile institutions of
higher education in America.
Another effect of the Revolution was to chill any taste for things
French, and to rekindle the remaining embers of Anglophilial senti-
ments, especially in New England.' 24 Americans stopped reading Mon-
tesquieu. It became less fashionable to speak hopefully of transmitting
republican virtue to the people, as even such New Englanders as John
Adams had, 125 for virtue was a term that was frequently on the lips of
those who manned the guillotine, Marat, Danton, St. Just, and
Robespierre. 126
Less clear in its relationship, but also a likely reaction to events in
France, was the steady rise in American anti-elitism leading ultimately to
the emergence of Andrew Jackson in 1828.127 There was an unmistaka-
bly elitist pretension in the Revolutionaries' idea of American law teach-
ing that was reflected in Tocqueville's characterization of American
120. NOLL, supra note 92, at 290-96.
121. SAMUEL E. MORISON, THREE CENTURIES OF HARVARD 1636-1936, at 171-78 (1937).
122. Id at 252-53.
123. 1 KEMP P. BATrLE, HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 173 (1907).
124. In Federalist New England, "the mark of a wise and good man was that he abhorred the
French Revolution, and believed democracy to be its cause." HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF JEFFERSON AND MADISON 63 (Ernest Samu-
els ed., 1967).
125. See 2 ADAMS, supra note 39, at 5-6.
126. Lieber, a German emigre and a Francophobe, writing in 1837, wrote three volumes that
essentially defined classical civic virtue in the contemporary American context, without ever using
the term "virtue." He wrote of "patriotism." LIEBER, supra note 94.
127. See generally ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF JACKSON (1945).
[Vol. 41:741
B UTTERFL Y EFFECTS
lawyers as "an aristocracy." 128 Wythe and his fellow Whigs emerged
from a culture in which noblesse oblige was a piece of the moral furni-
ture129 and the teaching tradition he established was laden with that im-
pulse. And Jacksonian democracy was hard on such pretensions.
Not least among the anti-elitist effects was the election of judges in
many states, an institution removing those offices from the grasp of the
few who participated in higher education or could afford private profes-
sional training. Although Jacksonian judges were generally able to read,
they were less likely to be receptive to arguments supported by citations
to the classics, by foreign notions, or by economic or political theory that
appealed to the academic class. In such times, colleges were disadvan-
taged in their efforts to persuade prospective students of their utility to
any career in law, public or private. To say that antebellum colleges
practiced open admissions is to understate the matter. 130
An astute contemporary observer of this collision between law and
populism was James Fenimore Cooper. While celebrating the values of
the Revolution in his earlier work, Cooper returned from seven years in
Europe in 1833 to find cause for concern. Pleading with his fellow citi-
zens to practice virtue,131 Cooper was apprehensive; the lawyers he cre-
ated in fiction were generally self-seekers, or cunning pettifoggers,
although one at least was merely a harmless pedant. 132 In Home as
Found, Cooper expressed the fear that America was "a runaway carriage
crashing downhill" 133 and decried the "leveling process" that is "insensi-
bly taking the place of the ancient laws of propriety."1 34 The antihero of
this novel was a status-hungry lawyer who is proud to be American, but
who has no idea of any commitments that this condition might entail.
The antihero is described as a "compound of shrewdness, impudence,
128. 1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 66, at 297-307. As Geoffrey Hazard has observed, Tocqueville
was using the term to describe a balance wheel for democracy, not to imply generational continuity.
See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1268-73 (1991).
129. The debates in the Virginia House of Burgesses are fully recorded; one reader observed that
among Virginians at the close of the eighteenth century:
men of the first class were equal to any standard of excellence known to history. Their
range was narrow, but within it they were supreme .... Social position was a birthright,
not merely of the well born, but of the highly gifted .... Law and politics were the only
objects of Virginia thought; but within these bounds the Virginians achieved triumphs.
1 ADAMS, supra note 124, at 98-99.
130. Pennsylvania took students at the age of 12, EDWARD P. CHEYNEY, HISTORY OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 1740-1940, at 186 (1940), Georgetown at age 8, JOHN M. DALEY,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY: ORIGIN AND EARLY YEARS 226 (1957).
131. See JAMES F. COOPER, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRAT (1838); JAMES F. COOPER, A LETTER
TO HIS COUNTRYMEN (1831). For a fictional statement of the aristocratic views expressed in these
political tracts, see JAMES F. COOPER, HOMEWARD BOUND (1838).
132. See FERGUSON, supra note 65, at 300.
133. JAMES F. COOPER, HOME AS FOUND 56 (1838).
134. Id. at 189.
Vol. 41:741]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
common-sense, pretension, humility, cleverness, vulgarity, kind-hearted-
ness, duplicity, selfishness, law-honesty, moral fraud, and mother-
wit.''135 In his final novel, Cooper betrayed what must be accounted a
missynchronization with his times by making his heroine a brilliant law-
yer, perhaps the equal of Portia herself. 136 Perhaps this turn in Cooper's
later work was the product of dyspepsia, but it seems intended as a reflec-
tion of the moral decline in public affairs that he observed in the state
around him. Similar observations were being made. by such men as
Kent, 3 7 Lieber, 138 and Story, 139 who despised Jackson and warmly sup-
ported his adversary, Henry Clay, the former law teacher.
Nevertheless, the tradition in legal education established by Wythe
was not irreconcilable to Jacksonian democracy, nor did it exclude Dem-
ocrats. There was no purpose in the still emerging tradition of American
law teaching to exclude anyone from the responsibilities of governance,
or to assign any value to intergenerational continuity such as might be
implied from Tocqueville's term, "aristocracy." The credo of public
duty was hardly a monopoly of social class."4
This was made evident when a member of the Jackson cabinet, Ben-
jamin Butler, himself a "barnburner,"' 41 was assigned to organize the
curriculum for the law department at New York University. The aims
he chose to pursue at least loosely corresponded to the moral aims of
Wythe and Lieber, for he, too, acknowledged the need for trained leader-
ship in a democracy at the same time that he supported the election of
judges.142 Thus, just as the Revolutionary idea of American law teaching
135. Id. at 10.
136. See FERGUSON, supra note 65, at 302-03. The novel was JAMES F. COOPER, THE WAYS OF
THE HOUR (1850).
137. On January 9, 1835, Kent wrote to Henry Clay: "I sympathize with you in all your public
feelings & Doings since the beginning of the reign of the present Dynasty." Letter from James Kent
to Henry Clay (Jan. 9, 1835), in 8 THE PAPERS OF HENRY CLAY 755 (Robert Seager II ed., 1984).
138. See Letter from Francis Lieber to Henry Clay (Nov. 8, 1834), in 8 THE PAPERS OF HENRY
CLAY, supra note 137, at 750 ("We are already in a revolution, as nations so often are long before
they know it."). To which, Clay replied that he, too, would despair "if we were not forbidden to
entertain that sentiment." Letter from Henry Clay to Francis Lieber (Dec. 3, 1834), in 8 THE
PAPERS OF HENRY CLAY, supra note 137, at 752.
139. See WILLIAM W. STORY, LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 85-89 (William W. Story
ed., 1851); see also NEWMYER, supra note 88, at 182 (praising Clay).
140. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 71 (1988).
141. The term applied to radical New York Democrats, after the farmer who burned his barn to
kill the rats. SCHLESINGER, supra note 127, at 398.
142. In 1835, Benjamin F. Butler, then the U.S. Attorney General, agreed to develop a plan for
the establishment of a faculty of law at recently established New York University. RONALD L.
BROWN, THE LAW SCHOOL PAPERS OF BENJAMIN F. BUTLER: NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
OF LAW IN THE 1830s, at 7 (1987). Butler's plan was approved and he accepted an appointment to
commence in 1837. Id. The university was modeled on the new institution in London, and was
accordingly much influenced by Bentham. Butler was, with his friend and political colleague, David
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had been shared by Jefferson and Hamilton, so it could be shared by the
supporters of Clay and Jackson.
B. The World Price of Cotton
A second and more troublesome impediment to law teaching as
training in public morality came with the resurgence of the blight of slav-
ery. Montesquieu had proclaimed that the institutions of slavery could
not co-exist with the institutions of a republic, 143 and the Revolutionary
generation of Americans recognized this to be so. The incongruity of
slavery among a people that had uttered the Declaration of Indepen-
dence was obvious. Indeed, slaveowners had protested the language of
the Declaration at the time of the utterance.144 There can be no doubt
that Jefferson intended his words to apply to each and every slave as well
as to free men:145 His choice of the phrase "pursuit of Happiness" as a
modification of John Locke's triadic entitlements of life, liberty, and
property 146 was not an accident.' 47
Dudley Field, an adherent of Bentham's proposals for codification of the common law. He also
advocated the popular election of Supreme Court Justices, an idea generally accepted by state consti-
tutional conventions dominated by Jacksonians. Despite his populism, Butler's ambition as an edu-
cator was to advance the development of a legal profession that would serve as a political elite, who
would piactice the public morality necessary to sustain the trust of the people in popular institutions.
See Benjamin F. Butler, The Usefulness of the Legal Profession; and the Necessity and Importance of
Providing Additional Means for Instruction in Legal Science" An Inaugural Address, in BROWN,
supra, at 168.
143. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 13, bk. XV, ch. 1, § 3.
144. Criticism came from Robert Carter Nicholas, a leading Revolutionary. A response from
another Revolutionary slaveowner came from Edmund Randolph, who replied:
Perhaps with too great an indifference to futurity, and not without inconsistency, that with
arms in our hands, asserting the general rights of man, we ought not to be too nice and too
much restricted in the delineation of them; but that slaves, not being constituent members
of our society, could never pretend to any benefit from such a maxim.
EDMUND RANDOLPH, HISTORY OF VIRGINIA 253 (1970).
145. Jefferson's opposition to slavery in 1776 cannot be doubted. His first draft of the Declara-
tion of Independence included the importation of slaves as one of the important offenses committed
by the English crown. 1 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND His TIME 222 (1951); see also THOMAS
JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA 162 (1781). He was, at the same time, somewhat racist in his
reactions, although perhaps less so than most Virginians of his generation. See FAWN M. BRODIE,
THOMAS JEFFERSON: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 157-59 (1974) (providing examples of Jefferson's ra-
cist view toward Blacks, nonetheless concluding that his errors were less deplorable than the errors
of eighteenth century society). In his last years, Jefferson appears to have been alarmed at the idea of
emancipation and its consequences. See 6 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME 316-27
(1981).
146. The term appears in the initial stated reason for the revolutionary act: "We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
147. Some of the early constitutions of southern states corrected Jefferson's departure from
Locke's triad to assure protection of slave property. See, e.g., LA. CONST. of 1812, art. I, § 2.
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It was but three years after his authorship of the Declaration that
Jefferson established American law teaching. It would be too much to
infer that the aim of law teaching was to affirm the inalienable human
rights to "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." But there was a
visible connection between education and democracy, as Montesquieu
had seen. Although lending the force of law to all such claims to "ina-
lienable rights" would have been a form of moral imperialism that no one
was prepared to accept from officers of the law, it was obvious that a
republic deriving its legitimacy from the consent of the governed could
not long recognize and enforce exclusions that would result in the justifi-
able withholding of consent by many of those to be governed.
For this reason, the Revolutionary generation spoke freely of the
emancipation of the slaves. 148 Under the leadership of David Howell and
Nathan Dane, the Continental Congress by the Northwest Ordinance of
1787 prohibited slavery in the region north of the Ohio River;149 Howell
was later professor of law at Brown;150 Dane was later the patron of
Harvard Law School responsible for its rebirth under the leadership of a
Jeffersonian, Justice Story.151 Benjamin Rush, who also established
Dickinson College as a "temple of justice,"1 52 led the emancipation
movement in Pennsylvania. Ezra Stiles, the Jeffersonian President of
Yale who studied law to teach republican virtue, led the emancipation
movement in Connecticut.1 53 In New Jersey, the movement was led by
William Paterson, a staunch Federalist, with the support of fellow
Princetonians such as Samuel Stanhope Smith, also a divine who had
become a law teacher.1 54 Professor George Wythe, acting on such
thoughts, emancipated his slaves when in 1782 that became permissible
in Virginia. And his successor, Professor St. George Tucker, led the
148. Albeit not universally; advocates of slavery could be heard not only in the South, but else-
where in America and abroad. See LARRY E. TisE, PROSLAVERY: A HISTORY OF THE DEFENSE OF
SLAVERY IN AMERICA, 1701-1840, at 12-40, 75-123 (1987).
149. DAVID B. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1770-1823, at
153-56 (1975); see also id at 153 n.74 (describing the roles of Howell and Dane).
150. Howell's role at Brown is described in WALTER C. BRONSON, THE HISTORY OF BROWN
UNIVERSITY, 1764-1914, at 38 (1914); see also 9 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 301
(1932).
151. Dane's role at Harvard is described in SUTHERLAND, supra note 82, at 92-98.
152. JAMES H. MORGAN, DICKINSON COLLEGE: THE HISTORY OF ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY
YEARS 1783-1933, at 41 (1933).
153. See MORGAN, supra note 91, at 452.
154. JOHN E. O'CONNOR, WILLIAM PATERSON: LAWYER AND STATESMAN, 1745-1806, at 29,
212-13 (1979). The New Jersey emancipationists were, to say the least, gradualist in approach. See
DAVIS, supra note 149, at 315.
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emancipation movement in Virginia, publishing an elaborate plan consid-
ered by the Virginia legislature in 1792.155 Henry Clay and others associ-
ated with the Transylvania Law Department led the emancipation
movement in Kentucky, although opposed by George Nicholas, the first
person appointed to teach law at that institution. 156 There was no oppo-
sition when President Jefferson in 1809 led Congress to the abolition of
the slave trade on the first day that this could be done under the terms of
the Constitution. 157
By 1809, however, the institution of slavery was clearly gaining
strength.1 53 It had been buttressed in some degree by the contagion of
fear spread by the French Revolution, and especially by its aftermath in
Santo Domingo-where slaveowning families had been butchered and
their survivors driven out, many of them to New Orleans, soon to be-
come an American city.15 9 A frightening echo of this event was the
South Carolina uprising led by Denmark Vesey. 6° Such events led the
aging Jefferson to note in 1820 that the South had a "wolf by the
ears."
161
But the driving force behind the rise of slavery was the invention of
the cotton gin in New Haven in 1793 and the resulting demand in Eu-
rope for cotton with which to manufacture clothing.' 62 The rise in the
world price of cotton increased the value of slaves, and of the land in
southern states on which cotton could be grown with slave labor.1 63 The
resulting prosperity of cotton agriculture renewed the enthusiasm of
southern planters for slavery, turning the old tobacco states into breeding
states that exported slaves to the cotton states emerging in the southwest,
155. See ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY WITH A PROPOSAL FOR THE
GRADUAL ABOLITION OF IT IN THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1796).
156. Nicholas's support for slavery is described in BROWN, supra note 105, at 228-31. Nicholas
did not in fact teach law at Transylvania because he died shortly after his appointment in 1799. See
generally Charles Kerr, Transylvania University's Law Department, 31 AMERICANA 7, 27 (1937).
157. Too much can be made of this enactment; one of its effects was to enhance the value of
slaves already in America. It was for this reason that opposition was slight among slaveowners. See
DAVIS, supra note 149, at 324-29.
158. See TISE, supra note 148, at 41-74.
159. See C.L.R. JAMES, THE BLACK JACOBINS: TOUSSAINT L'OUVERTURE AND THE SAN
DOMINGO REVOLUTION (2d ed. 1963).
160. See DAVIS, supra note 149, at 309-10.
161. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Holmes (April 22, 1820), in 15 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 249 (Albert E. Bergh ed., 1907) ("[W]e have the wolf by the ears, and we
can neither hold him, nor safely let him go. Justice is in one scale, and self-preservation in the
other.").
162. THOMAS E. DRAKE, QUAKERS AND SLAVERY IN AMERICA 100-01 (1950).
163. See DOUGLAS C. NORTH, THE ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES, 1790-1860,
at 62-68 (1961).
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and developing a distinctive cotton culture not only more financially re-
warding to slavemasters, but also even more harsh to slaves than the
tobacco culture had been. Many of the southern advocates of antislav-
ery, especially the Quakers, found the situation so distasteful that they
emigrated to the Northwest. 164 Meanwhile, of course, the northern econ-
omy was growing still more rapidly than that of the South, and the moral
revulsion to slavery was becoming mor6 intense from the hostility of
workers selling labor in a free market to the competition of slaves. The
two courses of development pointed to the near inevitability of disaster.
The disaster was foreseen by most of those teaching law, who were
engaged in transmitting to students a sense of public duty or "patriot-
ism" as some came to describe republican virtue. 165 They generally sup-
ported Henry Clay, their one-time co-venturer in law teaching and his
program for compensated emancipation of slaves. 166 In hindsight, this
was clearly the program that would have best served the nation; the enor-
mous carnage of the Civil War far exceeded in cost the burdens associ-
ated with the emancipationist program, to say nothing of what it would
have spared the South. Yet it was opposed with equal ardor by slave-
owners committed to preserving the culture of cotton slavery 167 and by
some abolitionists who preferred immediate disunion to any compensa-
tion of slaveowners whom they proclaimed to be morally degraded, 168
164. See DAVID B. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770-
1823, at 199 (1975).
165. See Carrington, supra note 33.
166. Clay and Madison were founders of the Colonization Society. The program was one of
gradual emancipation of the type effected in northern states, with the freemen to be voluntarily
resettled in Africa, Central America, or the western United States. Clay described the program for
the Kentucky Society. See 8 THE PAPERS OF HENRY CLAY, supra note 137, at 138-58. The Coloni-
zation Society was not without its critics, many of them severe in their judgments. Some accused
Clay and his supporters of trying to make slavery more secure by removing the free blacks. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM L. GARRISON, THOUGHTS ON COLONIZATION (1832). Numbered among the severe crit-
ics was Clay's student at Transylvania, James Birney, who organized the Alabama branch of the
Society. See 5 THE PAPERS OF HENRY CLAY, supra note 137, at 120 ed. n. In 1834, Birney con-
cluded that Clay "had no conscience about the matter, and therefore, that he would swim with the
popular current." 8 id. at 748 n.1. Birney ran against Clay for President in 1844, declaring Clay to
be "of all our public men, the most dangerous, because the boldest or the most insidious, according
to the exigency, and always the most plausible in his attacks on the cause of human freedom." 2
LETTERS OF JAMES GILLESPIE BIRNEY 1831-1851, at 898 (Dwight L. Dumond ed., 1938). Birney
polled 60,000 votes, which was just enough to deny Clay the electoral votes of New York and the
election. PETERSON, supra note 89, at 366. The result was the election of James K. Polk, the candi-
date of proslavery.
167. Border state representatives refused compensated emancipation in 1862 on the very eve of
the Emancipation Proclamation. MCPHERSON, supra note 108, at 503.
168. The Garrisonian premise seems to have been that disunion and aggressive support of fugi-
tives would bring down the house of slavery without extreme violence. Meanwhile, the Constitution
supported by most law teachers was a pact with the devil. See DWIGHT L. DUMOND, ANTISLAV-
ERY: THE CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM IN AMERICA 307-25 (1961); AILEEN KRADITOR, MEANS AND
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and even though disunion would probably have left the cotton-slavery
culture intact.
As readers know, the fugitive slave issue gave rise to much of the
increasing bitterness on both sides. The text of the Constitution obli-
gated all states to honor the property claims of slaveowners, 169 but the
entitlements of the fugitives were also obvious to those who heeded either
the text of the Declaration of Independence or the republican imperative
of securing the assent of all those governed. Law teachers, like judges,
were trapped between the moral imperatives of saving the nation by en-
forcing the law, and of redeeming the nation's legitimacy by bringing
slavery to an end.
No active law teacher appears to have participated in the effort to
achieve liberation of slaves through legal or extra-legal action in support
of fugitives that denied validity to the Constitution or threatened to cause
disunion, 170 although many colleges harbored stations on the under-
ground railroad.1 71 On the other hand, only one law teacher 172 appears
to have supported the dehumanizing rationalization of fugitive slave law
advanced by Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford.173 One law
teacher who was also a judge was dismissed by Harvard on account of his
ENDS IN AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM: GARRISON AND HIS CRITICS ON STRATEGY AND TACTICS,
1834-1850, at 102-08, 178-224 (1969); JOHN L. THOMAS, THE LIBERATOR: WILLIAM LLOYD GAR-
RISON 326-37 (1963).
169. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
170. For a description of antislavery litigation, see ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED
(1975).
171. See WILBUR H. SIEBERT, THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD: FROM SLAVERY TO FREE-
DOM 115 (1968) (citing Oberlin College, Western Reserve College, and Geneva College as three
examples).
172. James P. Holcombe taught Constitutional Law at the University of Virginia as a colleague
of John Barbee Minor. His parents had freed their slaves and moved from their Virginia home to
Indiana. He thereafter attended Yale, Virginia, and Staunton and practiced law in western Virginia
and in Cincinnati. While in Cincinnati, he had published a simplified version of Story on Equity and
several other works, including one ambitiously entitled Rise of Intellectual Liberty. In his teaching,
he advocated a proslavery position. He resigned in 1861 to seek election to the Confederate Con-
gress. After the war, he conducted a preparatory school and edited a successful collection of belles
lettres. E. Lee Shepard, James Philemon Holcombe, in LEGAL EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 1779-1979,
at 291-95 (W. Hamilton Bryson ed., 1982). Two earlier supporters of slavery were N. Beverley
Tucker, the professor at William and Mary from 1834 to 1851, and Thomas Cooper. Tucker was the
second and prodigal son of St. George Tucker; his older brother had the more distinguished career as
judge and as teacher at the University of Virginia. See ROBERT J. BRUGGER, BEVERLEY TUCKER:
HEART OVER HEAD IN THE OLD SOUTH (1978); Robert J. Brugger, Nathaniel Beverley Tucker, in
LEGAL EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 1779-1979, supra, at 643-56. Thomas Cooper, the President at
South Carolina from 1822 to 1834, was in his youth in England an ardent critic of the slave trade
and an admirer of the French Revolution. After moving to South Carolina, he became the academic
spokesman for slavery. MALONE, supra note 99, at 284-90.
173. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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judicial action returning a slave to an owner;174 his dismissal was accom-
plished despite his support by law teaching colleagues who recognized
his action as a performance of judicial duty. 175 Those same colleagues
soon encouraged their students to go to Kansas to support the Free Soil
Movement in that state. 176
In addition to Clay, there was one sometime law teacher who was
active on the slavery issue in an official role. He was Charles Sumner, a
favorite student of Joseph Story and sometime instructor at Harvard,
who as a Senator from Massachusetts was outspokenly hostile to the cot-
ton culture and was paid for his efforts by a nearly fatal caning on the
Senate floor inflicted by Senator Preston Brooks of South Carolina. 177
Equally outspoken as the War approached was Francis Lieber, then at
Columbia,178 and a personal friend of Sumner. 179
174. In 1853, Edward G. Loring was recommended by the faculty for appointment as professor
of law at Harvard. The overseers turned down the appointment because Loring also planned to
continue as a commissioner of the federal court, but appointed him as lecturer, a duty he performed
to the considerable satisfaction of the students. A year later, he was dismissed for his judicial act in
ordering the return of a fugitive to a person claiming to be the fugitive's owner. For an account of
the litigation, see LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE
SHAW 105-06 (1957).
175. See 2 WARREN, supra note 47, at 196-200. His defenders insisted that the Harvard Law
School:
has been a very powerful instrument in removing and softening sectional prejudices.... If
you meet with a Southern lawyer or politician who is a secessionist, or a nullifier, or a hater
of New England, you will rarely find that he was educated at Dane Law College.
Is it worth while to turn this current of [southern] students from our doors? What is to
be gained by it? Is it worth while to proclaim through the land or to allow others to
proclaim, that our Law School is never to admit into one of its chairs of instruction any
person who has acted simply as a magistrate in the rendition of a fugitive slave?
Id at 198.
176. By 1856, both Professors Parker and Parsons had become politically active in the Free Soil
movement that sought to prevent the introduction of slavery to Kansas. One student reported:
I at once enlisted in the cause and was so encouraged in it by the Professors, that when I
proposed to go to the front in Kansas, the Faculty immediately said to me, "Yes, go, and
we will take care of you here, and in due time will send your diploma to you." The prom-
ise was kept, and the document was forwarded to me in the summer of 1857, when my
class graduated. This act shows how the big hearts of these dignified and conservative
professors and learned judges responded to freedom's call.
Id at 209.
177. The event led to a public occasion at the Harvard Law School, where Professor Parker
spoke, concluding:
For myself personally I am perhaps known to most of you as a peacable citizen, reasonably
conservative, devotedly attached to the Constitution, and much too far advanced in life for
gasconade; but under the present circumstances, I may be pardoned for saying that some of
my father's blood was shed on Bunker Hill, at the commencement of one revolution, and
that there is a little more of the same sort left, if it shall prove that need be, for the begin-
ning of another.
Id.
178. See FRANK FREIDEL, FRANcIs LIEBER: NINETEENTH-CENTURY LIBERAL 305-07 (1947).
179. See FRANcIs LIEBER, LIFE AND LEITERs OF FRANCIS LIEBER (1882). The slavery issue
interrupted their friendship for a time. See id. at 261-62.
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Lieber's relation to the issue is instructive. He taught Constitutional
Law at South Carolina from 1834 to 1857 as a full-time teacher and
scholar, perhaps the only antebellum American who could be so de-
scribed. Lieber was a German emigre, once declared an enemy of the
Prussian state for his radical politics, but later rehabilitated and invited
to return as advisor to the king.18 0 Lieber despised slavery, but declined
the offer to return to Berlin and remained in South Carolina. Although
he left his students in no doubt that his own public duty ran first to
America, not South Carolina, he did not dare publicly address the issue
of slavery. Yet he did (many years before the advent of academic tenure)
conclude a private communication to his U.S. Senator, John C. Calhoun:
"'It is not the North that is against you .... It is mankind, it is the
world, it is civilization, it is history, it is reason, it is God, that is against
slavery."18l
It became at last apparent that there was no balanced, disinterested
position for a virtuous republican to maintain with respect to the central
legal and political issue of the time. One casualty of the resulting stress
may have been the Transylvania Law Department, which closed its doors
in 1858, no longer able to maintain its transsectional position.
As a consequence of the general intransigence to apply the appropri-
ate remedy of emancipation favored by those who were attentive to the
public interest, over one million young men were killed or maimed. In
proportion to the population, this was one of the greatest bloodbaths of
the last millenium. The death total almost equalled that of all other wars
fought by the United States from 1776 to 1991 combined. The casualties
were borne by a population roughly that of California's today, but with a
median age of eleven years, resulting in the loss of more than one fourth
of the white males of military age. i82 Had the people listened to many
law teachers, the result would likely have been very different.
One cannot say, of course, what would have happened to slavery in
the South had the cotton gin not been invented for a few more decades,
and there had been no spike in the world demand for cotton. When and
how would the demise of slavery come? Slavery did disappear in Latin
America without need for the enormous carnage suffered in North
America, and presumably would have come to an end on this continent
as well, and perhaps before 1863. But, alas, the demand for cotton had
revitalized slavery in this country, postponed its demise, and magnified
180. Lieber's account of the event is set forth id at 185-88.
181. FREIDEL, supra note 178, at 241.
182. Few now are cognizant of the relative horror of that war. The following Table compiles
data from the Statistical Abstract of the United States. To provide comparability, the slave popula-
tion was excluded.
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by Grant Gilmore as the "law's black night,"185 by which term he re-
ferred to a failure of the judicial heart for the Grand Manner that had
previously characterized American judicial lawmaking. The American
judiciary, reflecting the dispirited American morale, seemingly feared to
exercise its accustomed political responsibility and took general refuge in
the pretense of apolitical formalism. 18 6 A formal style was manifested by
the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century, and was for a time the
dominant style of state courts dealing with private law questions. 187 This
change in the style of courts may well have influenced the forms of advo-
cacy, and thus, too, the patterns and content of law teaching.
In addition, of course, there was Jim Crow, the unsightly vestige of
slavery that emerged after Reconstruction had dissolved. During the
"law's dark night," the dilemma posed to American law teachers by the
institutions of slavery and the fugitive slave continued, albeit in moder-
ated form. No longer was the existence of the nation in question, nor
were those seeking to preserve it called upon to return innocent captives
to a cruel fate. But the South remained almost a nation apart, divided
between black and white, and neither division quite a member of the
whole. There, much of the black population of America was held in a
state of bondage only marginally more humane than the slavery from
which it had emerged.
Because a devastated nation lacked the political will to complete Re-
construction, the remnant of the cotton-slave culture was able to main-
tain a caste system that not only imposed continuing restrictions on black
citizens, but also thereby withheld democratic legitimacy from the legal
institutions operating in the South in much the way that slavery had.
Law teachers seeking to inculcate commitment to the national polity
were still burdened to explain even to themselves why democratic institu-
tions deformed in this way were appropriate objects for the kind of loy-
alty required of virtuous republicans or lawyer-patriots. But if the courts
were impotent to deal with the caste system in the South,188 law teachers,
185. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41 (1977).
186. See ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 248-49. For a discussion of the effect of this
period on the structure and administration of the federal courts, see Paul D. Carrington, The Func-
tion of the Civil Appeal: A Late-Century View, 38 S.C. L. REv. 411 (1987).
187. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 52, at 41. Llewellyn reports that the Formal Style was still
evident in Maryland and Massachusetts as late as 1939. See id.
188. For an account of the legal status of segregation, see William Cohen, Negro Involuntary
Servitude in the South, 1865-1940." A Preliminary Analysis, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 317 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber
eds., 1988).
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at least in the North, were free to protest and some did,189 although with
little apparent effect. -
Only in the mid-twentieth century, after the migration of black
Americans from the cotton fields of the South had begun in earnest and
World War II had made racism unacceptable, was it possible to marshal
the political will to face Jim Crow. When the time came, one of the first
groups to call for its demise were the law teachers, by then organized in
the Association of American Law Schools, and eager to support the
claims of southern blacks to equal access to the legal profession. 190 But
the open sore was not so easily healed as that.
C. The Rise of Professionalism
A third external force striking against the Revolutionary conception
of law teaching as moral education appeared in a nation still convalescing
from that gruesome Civil War, with its legal system very much in a noc-
turnal state.
189. Little if any of the meager supply of Constitutional Law scholarship written during the
"law's black night" was devoted to any social problems regarding race or otherwise. However, as
the student-edited journals began to take their place in this century, there was a growing chorus of
criticism of the failures of Constitutional Law to transform race relations law in the South. For
examples, see the law review notes on the issue of the right of African-Americans to vote in "white
primaries" decided in Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) and Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932): Morton Milman, Comment, Constitutional Law: Elections: Exclusion of Negroes from
Primaries, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 262 (1930); Note, Rights of Negroes to Vote in State Primaries, 43
HARV. L. REv. 467 (1929); Comment, 25 ILL. L. REV. 699 (1930); Recent Cases, 14 MINN. L. REV.
83 (1929); Alvin J. Feldman, Note, Constitutional Law--Elections--Racial Discrimination in the
Party Primary, 8 N.Y.U. L. REV. 309 (1930); see also F. Earl Lamboley, Note, Exclusion of Negroes
from Democratic State Primary Election, 4 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341 (1929); Recent Case Notes,
39 YALE L.J. 423-24 (1930). Southern law review editors tended to be defensive. See, e.g., Travis
Brown, Comment, Constitutional Law-Elections-Race Discrimination-Party Rules Excluding
Negroes from Voting in Primaries, 9 N.C. L. REV. 207 (1930). Some were extremely so, one such
note concluding:
It cannot be denied that the effect of this statute is practically to deny to the negro the right
to vote. However, the fact that this is the practical effect hardly seems to be enough to
justify it being declared unconstitutional. The negro can still form his own party and vote
in his own primary. The fact that he could never elect his own candidate does not change
his right.
Note, 16 VA. L. REv. 193, 197 (1929). One must wonder what that student's teacher in Constitu-
tional Law thought of that note; it was worthy of the teaching of James Holcombe. See supra note
172. On the other hand, some dissatisfaction or unease with southern tradition is manifested in
Note, 9 TEx. L. REv. 439 (1930) and Cases, 5 TULANE L. REV. 309 (1930). The Texas note was
written by Joseph C. Hutcheson III, the son of the judge who decided one of the white primary cases
in the district court. See Grigsby v. Harris, 27 F.2d 942 (S.D. Tex. 1928).
190. The efforts of the Association were led by John Frank, then of Indiana, Erwin Griswold,
the Harvard dean, and Edward Levi, the Chicago dean. See Jonathan L. Entin, Sweat v. Painter,
The End of Segregation, and the Transformation of Education Law, 5 REV. LITIo. 3 (1986). Their
brief in Sweatt was published in Segregation and the Equal Protection Clause: Brieffor the Commit-
tee of Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education, 34 MINN. L. Rav. 289 (1950).
BUTTERFLY EFFECTS
Post-Civil War America, with much of the world, almost suddenly
grasped the ideas of division of labor and technology as the promise of
release from all human bondages. 191 This conception seems to have first
struck the English public at the Crystal Palace, where an array of tech-
nologies presented to visitors to the Great Exhibition of 1851 moved Vic-
toria to conclude: "We are capable of doing anything." 192 By 1870, this
optimism about technology had penetrated American minds. In
medicine, engineering, law, economics, and a dozen new fields, many of
them serving to facilitate the entry of American women into public and
professional life (such as education, nursing, social work, and librarian-
ship) there was a contagion of interest in technocratic professionalism, in
the development of almost any kind of skill that could be said to have
roots in what was loosely called science. Professional organizations, such
as the American Bar Association, 193 appeared in number and came to
exercise increasing regulatory power over career opportunities in the sev-
eral professional fields, often using higher education credentialing as the
measures of qualification. 194
In hindsight, we can now see that the movement to meritocratic
professionalism was very powerful. It may simply have throttled Marx-
ism as a political force in its infancy. Widespread land ownership and
the frontier had, with the very important exception of slavery, prevented
the development of a substantial underclass until the urban laborers ap-
peared in force in mid-century. But even then, there was no serious pros-
pect of class war in a society dominated by landowners and providing
substantial social mobility through open professions. The urban middle
class was aborning, and the hope if not the fact of prosperity was offered
to almost all. Succeeding waves of immigrants populated urban ghettos
for a generation as their children (especially the males) moved on to be
technocrats of one kind or another.
By creating a demand for a vast range of professional services and
professional training, the impulse to technocracy transformed American
universities. Universities became in part what we now recognize as the
191. See MAGALI S. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
141-45 (1977). For the special effect on law, see ia at 166-76.
192. JAMES MORRIS, HEAVEN'S COMMAND: AN IMPERIAL PROGRESS 196 (1973).
193. For a comprehensive history of the American Bar Association, see EDSON R. SUNDER-
LAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND ITS WORK (1953).
194. Alfred Z. Reed was commissioned by the Carnegie Foundation to study legal education at
the urging of the American Bar Association, in the disappointed hope that it would lead to an
increase in requirements corresponding to those established for medical education. See generally
ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE
1980S 172-90 (1983).
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factories of human capital run by educational entrepreneurs, 195 and they
commenced about 1890 a boom that resulted in higher education becom-
ing a major national industry that is perhaps only now beginning to slow.
With, respect to law, the technocratic impulse set in motion a still-
growing demand for legal services that has attracted into law study many
whose career aims are directed chiefly at the private sector law firms and
corporate offices that respond to that demand. Technocratic law teach-
ing thus sold well because America wanted and perhaps needed a techno-
cratic legal profession, one that would seem in its intellectual
substructure and academic status respectable in comparison to the other
rising professions. That profession, as all can observe, emerged in the
century following 1890 to become a significant component of the Ameri-
can national economy and even a noticeable feature of international
markets.
So it was that the almost world-wide impulse to technocracy rein-
forced the shift in American legal method and theory, sustaining and
magnifying the moment of apolitical formalism. To seem a technocrat,
not a politician, was an ambition widely shared among judges and law-
yers. 196 This ambition fed the aspiration to decide legal matters on the
basis of internal logic divorced from social context or political responsi-
bility. That moment of formalism cut deeply against the grain of Ameri-
can political arrangements set in Constitutional concrete, and hence was
doomed to be short-lived, but it survived for long enough to affect law
teaching significantly.
The impulse to technocratic professionalism and the moment of for-
malism in American law provided just the right environment to reward
the initiative of Christopher Columbus Langdell. Seeking the approval
of a generation of technocrats as well as to sell his wares to students
otherwise likely to train for legal careers as apprentices, Langdell's eye
hit upon the ore of case law embodied in currently reported opinions of
American courts-that manifestation of post-Revolutionary politics. He
was soon able to devise a process of refinement of this ore that borrowed
heavily from judicial formalism and that could with some success be
passed off as a new science of law. 197
195. For a description and a defense of the American "multiversity" as it had become by mid-
century, see CLARK KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSIrY (1963). Kerr wrote as the President of
the University of California on the eve of substantial disorder from which his institution may yet be
convalescing.
196. There was also an increase in the rigid formalism of the judicial method in England in the
last four decades of the nineteenth century. See DAWSON, supra note 26, at 90-91.
197. Romans had so spoken of law, and Blackstone claimed no less for the law of his kingdom
than that it was rooted in scientific verity. BOORSTIN, supra note 49, at 11-31.
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Langdell and his academic heir, James Barr Ames, made little effort
to extend this pseudo-science to the study of constitutional or other pub-
lic law. Private law could often be examined "scientifically," in accord-
ance with its presumed internal symmetry and in disregard of its social
and political consequences, 198 where public law seldom could. Contracts
thus became the queen science of the law school for the reason that the
law of contracts so seldom intersected social or political issues that might
impair the disinterest of the legal scientist. 199 In part, this was because
almost any person or firm that made promises might break them. Ac-
cordingly, it was possible to put contracts doctrine into a politically anti-
septic format.
Langdell, Ames, and their adherents therefore demoted Constitu-
tional Law in their curriculum and left the writing of it largely to
Thomas McIntyre Cooley of Michigan, 2°° and others not averse to the
soil of politics. 201 An adverse consequence of this technocratic emphasis
was isolation of law study from broader intellectual efforts directed at
other social phenomena bearing on the law.2 02 Political economy and
Shakespeare were banished from the minds of legal professionals; a
knowledge of such immaturities could be presumed on the part of those
credentialed by an undergraduate institution.
Similar isolation befell other fields of academic endeavor, but it was
especially unfortunate for a profession trained as a political elite. The
admirable intellectual breadth brought to their work by educated ante-
bellum lawyers trained by men such as Wythe, Tucker, Hoffman, Kent,
the Transylvanians, or Lieber was treated as a lesser attainment, or at
least separate from the goal of the professional lawyer-technocrat.
198. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed.
1880); see also Thomas C. Gray, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1983).
199. But cf Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV.
205 (1979) (arguing that making the distinction between "public" and "private" law is a very decep-
tive activity).
200. See, e.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION (1873); THOMAS
M. COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1880); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER
OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868); see also CLYDE E. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND
THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS M. COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN AND JOHN
F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW (1954). Cooley was also the architect of the
Sherman Act and first chair of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
201. These included James Bradley Thayer of Harvard, although Thayer's view of the role of the
judiciary was decidedly cautious. See, eg., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
202. See Paul D. Carrington, Book Review, 72 CAL. L. REV. 477, 485-89 (1984) (reviewing
ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE
1980s (1983)); cf Calvin Woodard, Progress and Poverty in American Law and Legal Education, 37
SYRACUSE L. REV. 795, 806-12 (1986) (arguing that Langdell's methods brought order to the chaos
of our common law system).
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Partly no doubt to emphasize the elevated status of the professionals
trained at Harvard, Dean Langdell's school increased admission require-
ments to admit only college graduates. 203 This allowed the school to as-
sume that its students had already been taught what they needed to know
of the classics and political economy and to concentrate on law as tech-
nocracy, thereby increasing the isolation. In this respect, the Harvard
educational style widely used in the late-nineteenth century threatened to
unfit law graduates for public service, by imparting to them an insular
notion of their discipline.
By extending the course of academic law study to three years, 2°4
Dean Langdell ingeniously, or perhaps even unwittingly, conformed to
the growing ambition of students to enhance the value of their services by
investing in exclusive professional training. Thus, elite university legal
education has in recent decades been seen, at least in important part, as
an investment by students on which they expect a handsome return. 205
Most contemporary American law students borrow heavily to finance
their costly professional training. Relative incomes of many American
professions have risen steadily over the last century (but none perhaps
more than law) and have made this kind of investment financially sound.
Within the legal profession, a disparity in income expectations be-
tween those who serve the public and those who serve private interests
has grown apace, perhaps particularly in the last two decades.20 6 As a
result, students thinking of themselves as prospective public servants and
leaders are a declining portion of those studying law in America and are
less influential in setting the tone of the American law school
environment.
This acquisition of human capital by financial investment in profes-
sional training can dilute the impact of moral education. At best, finan-
cial motives are a distraction. No one who has been in a contemporary
American law school during the placement season can doubt the power-
ful short-term effect of that process on the moral values and sensibilities
of the students. Loan forgiveness, student-funded fellowships, and public
203. The requirement was first proposed by Langdell in 1875, but not fully implemented until
1909. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL 41-42 (1978); WARREN, supra note 47, at 394-98.
204. See STEVENS, supra note 194, at 36-37.
205. See John R. Kramer, Will Legal Education Remain 4ffordable, By Whom, and How?, 1987
DUKE L.J. 240, 248-50.
206. At the time of the 1990 enactment to increase federal judicial salaries, it was widely ob-
served that the young law clerks working at the elbows of Supreme Court Justices would in their first
year in the private sector earn more than an associate judge of the United States Supreme Court.
Joseph Deitch, New Jersey Q & 4: Harold .44ckerman; Seeking a Raise for Federal Judges, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 20, 1989, at 12NJ3.
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service externships are widespread efforts to correct the effect. Neverthe-
less, that effect may well dwarf the efforts of teachers to inculcate appro-
priate expectations as to how lawyers and judges think and behave in
their professional roles.207 It assuredly weakens, at least for an impor-
tant time, the students' shared sense of public purpose if most hope and
expect to do corporate mergers or other highly remunerative work in-
volving little or no service, or perhaps even requiring disservice, to the
public interest. Partly for this reason, too, some of the opportunity for
moral education has passed from the law schools to the law firms who
initiate students to the profession while they perform summer or part-
time employment, for it is there that students are more likely to meet
"real lawyers" engaged in the careers to which they aspire. This is so
despite Bar-imposed requirements that law schools teach the law gov-
erning lawyer conduct. 208
The profit motive of law students is quite possibly enhanced by a
vestige of the teaching of Langdell and Ames: The first year curriculum
conventional to American law schools centered on private law doctrine.
It is a legitimate radical critique of the curriculum that it emphasizes not
only the technocratic, but also the private service aspects of professional
work in law, and may thereby reinforce the expectations of students that
service to private paying clients is what they are training to do.209
In addition to this regrettable effect of the practice of human capital-
ism, there is another of broader significance. This rise of technocratic
professionalism made law study an exclusive activity, more elitist in a
different sense than formerly. Beginning in 1926 when the American Bar
Association began to accredit law schools, state supreme courts began to
require periods of academic study as a condition for admission to the
bar.210 University law schools were thus positioned as gatekeepers, a role
that became significant in the second half of the present century as the
number of persons seeking entry into the profession increased
exponentially.
In some minds, credentialism was a deliberate effort to exclude cer-
tain persons from the legal profession. Some of those advocating higher
professional standards in the early twentieth century did so for the stated
207. See Roger C. Cramton, Change and Continuity in Legal Education, 79 MICH. L. REV. 460,
462 (1981). Efforts to establish clinical legal education in the early 1970s were in some degree a
response to this problem. See, eg., David Barnhizer, The University Ideal and Clinical Legal Educa-
tion, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 87, 87-88 (1990).
208. A requirement enforced by a national multiple-choice test. For a brief description, see
Francis D. Morrissey, The Origins and Usefulness of the MPRE, 50 B. EXAMINER 24 (1981).
209. See Duncan Kennedy, The Political Significance of the Structure of the Law School Curricu-
lum, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1983).
210. See STEVENS, supra note 194, at 173-74.
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purpose of excluding from the profession recent immigrants, most nota-
bly Jewish immigrants, 21 1 for such persons were believed by the expo-
nents of exclusivity to be less trustworthy, and less capable of the
commitment to the public good required by public virtue. This was a
very different, even a competing aim, to that animating the origins of
American law teaching in the eighteenth century.
Insofar as the purpose was to effect an exclusion of Jews from mem-
bership in the bar, the increase in credentials requirements was a total
failure. Neither did it work, if it was so intended, for Catholics, who
found the means of credentialing their own by establishing many Catho-
lic law schools. With respect to these groups, the use of academic cre-
dentials as qualifications opened the profession for those entrants who
might otherwise have had difficulty in finding a suitable mentor or patron
to vouch for their apprenticeship training. More than a few offspring of
immigrants and other poor entered the competition for meritocratic aca-
demic credentials and prevailed over the sons of the overprivileged to
secure professional opportunities that would not otherwise have been
open to them. But those academic requirements surely did also have
some exclusionary effect on some visible groups, notably women and
blacks, who were less likely to be found among those making the invest-
ments in professional training required in increasing portions.
The absence of significant numbers of women and blacks among
judges, other legal officers, and the practicing bar called attention to the
endemic problem of legitimacy. Law teachers with entirely white male
classes had reason for anxiety in their shared hope that the interest of the
whole public would weigh heavily in the making of democratic decisions,
or that widespread trust could be evoked by their students from whom so
large a segment of the people were visibly excluded. There is perhaps a
caution in this experience for democracies emerging in 1992: Care
should be taken to assure access to legal training for members of all
groups within the polity, and unduly rigorous academic standards can be
an impediment to such access.
This is not to say that many American law schools ever embraced
an aim to exclude members of any group from the legal profession, ex-
cept those in the South that were parts of cultures that oppressed black
citizens. Yet the increased credentialing requirements surely contributed
to the slowness with which black Americans entered the legal profession
in number. Concentrated as they were until mid-twentieth century in
rural circumstances in the southern cotton culture remaining as a vestige
211. See id. at 100-01.
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of slavery, few blacks had the opportunity to prepare themselves for pro-
longed and elevated professional law study.212 Law schools outside the
South were open to black students, as indeed most were open to any
person with a few years of college. Tuitions were universally modest, but
financial aid was almost non-existent. There were a few law schools or-
ganized to train a black bar, but of these only Howard established it-
self.213 To make the necessary investment in legal training, one needed
to be sold on the reality of professional opportunity as a reward, and it
seems unsurprising if few blacks were convinced of that opportunity.
Even for those blacks who were not in the South, there was no career
counseling, as indeed there was none for anyone, white or black, male or
female. Thus, only a trickle of black students found their way into the
legal profession, and the rise in technocratic requirements was a contrib-
uting cause.
A similar effect on the entry of women may be observed. There had
been a small number of women entering law schools in the years follow-
ing the Civil War,214 and by 1890 almost all gender barriers to admission
had been dropped except at the few male colleges, such as some in the
Ivy League.215 The Harvard Law faculty voted to admit women students
in 1899, but they were defeated by vote of the Corporation.216 James
Bradley Thayer spoke for a majority of the faculty in saying that "he
should regret the presence of a woman in his classes, because he feared it
might affect the excellence of the work of the men; but he could not deny
the inherent justice of the claim." 217 Joseph Beale, no radical, opened a
law school for women in Cambridge in 1915,218 announcing that it would
be "as nearly [as possible] a replica of the Harvard Law School." 219
But few students enrolled in his school, or at the Portia School of
Law in Boston, an institution also founded to serve women.220 In part,
212. For an account of the state of most American blacks prior to mid-twentieth century, see
NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND How IT
CHANGED AMERICA 1-58 (1991).
213. For a brief account of the establishment of Howard, see STEVENS, supra note 194, at 81.
214. Notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme Court in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130 (1872), the legal constraints on women in law practice had largely disappeared by 1880.
See Janette Barnes, Women and Entrance to the Legal Profession, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 276 (1971).
215. This was not, of course, a change wrought without resistance. It had been necessary for
Clara Foltz to sue to gain admission to the state law school in California. See THOMAS G. BARNES,
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW: THE FrST CENTURY 47-57 (1978); Barbara A. Babcock, Clara
Shortridge Fol" "First Woman, " 30 ARiz. L. REV. 673, 700-14 (1988).
216. 2 WARREN, supra note 47, at 468.
217. Id.
218. Cambridge Law School, 5 WOMEN LAW. J. 15 (1915).
219. STEVENS, supra note 194, at 84. The school failed, in part for want of demand, and in part
because Beale's daughter married and gave up law. Id.
220. Id. at 83.
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this was surely because career opportunities for women were not good,221
and the competing impulse to form families was so widely and strongly
reinforced in the culture. These factors may have made the growing in-
vestment of time and foregone income required for the completion of
professional law study a greater deterrent for women than for men. Wo-
men came soon to predominate in many of the professions requiring
shorter periods of study and surer employment opportunities.222 The
tendency of women to avoid law study may have been encouraged by
some law teachers whose manners reflected gender roles deeply rooted in
the surrounding culture, but the length of formal education required was
almost certainly a more important impediment than any sexism detected
by those who did choose to study law. In any case, even though open to
women, most law schools remained substantially masculine in ambience,
and there was in such environments, we must suppose, ample sexist ban-
ter. The relative number of women entering the legal profession may
actually have diminished in the early decades of this century.
It is, however, by no means clear that the number of women and
black lawyers would have been much larger but for the elevation of aca-
demic credential requirements. Surely the causes of these phenomena
were numerous, and it is uncertain how university law teachers as they
worked before mid-twentieth century could realistically have done any-
thing that they did not do that would have materially altered the demog-
raphy of the profession. 223 If law schools had stayed with two years of
study instead of three or had tried harder to recruit or finance women
and minority students,224 or dampened the masculinity of the environ-
ment, it seems unlikely that the demographic differences would have
221. A strong market bias against women lawyers only began to recede after World War II. See
generally RONALD CHESTER, UNEQUAL ACCESS: WOMEN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING AMERICA
(1985).
222. See LARSON, supra note 191, at 173.
223. There were, to be sure, steps that could have been taken that might have made a little
difference. Today, we can imagine, for example, a law dean in 1920 manifesting the spirit of Branch
Rickey (who broke the color line in organized baseball in 1946) who might have selected a black law
teacher, say Charles Hamilton Houston, the teacher of Thurgood Marshall at Howard. Houston, a
favorite student of Roscoe Pound, was certainly qualified to teach elsewhere. See RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 125-31 (1976); Woodard, supra note 202, at 820-23. In 1920,
this would have required a rare degree of political and cultural heroism, far more than that required
of Rickey in 1946. In the South, where it might have made a significant difference, it would have
required epic heroism on the part of both teacher and dean. To measure some of the cultural disin-
centives from a contemporary criticism, see WILLIAM J. CASH, THE MIND OF THE SOUTH (1941).
Cash describes a society in which a professor was in danger of dismissal for expressing admiration
for Booker T. Washington. See id. at 323-24.
224. Louis Toepfer, appointed at Harvard in 1946, was the first such administrator. See Louis
A. Toepfer, Admissions: Procedures, Policies, Views, 8 HARv. L. SCH. BULL., Feb. 3, 1957, at 3.
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been great. Until the mid-twentieth century, given their modest admis-
sion standards, university law schools had too small a gatekeeping func-
tion, and too little influence on the demography of the profession to
matter significantly.
Whatever these secondary consequences of the increase in academic
credentials requirements, treating professional education as a financial
investment is not otherwise directly at odds with the aims of moral edu-
cation as practiced by persons such as Wythe or Lieber. It is certainly
not demonstrable that lawyers in the past were more honorable in their
participation in public affairs than they are today as a result of the ma-
lign influence of the marketplace. Even lawyers seeking wealth are un-
likely to find it if they do not understand the moral premises of the legal
tradition in which they work. Most contemporary American law stu-
dents are therefore generally willing to accept as part of their profes-
sional training the discipline of disinterested thinking about specific and
important public issues. Moreover, teachers of public virtue are neces-
sarily preoccupied with issues of contemporary significance, so their in-
terests must sometimes coincide with those of even the most narrowly
careerist students. In addition, even the most technocratic students may
in time find themselves in public careers, and those who do may be influ-
enced in their public morality by their experience in the university.
Finally, it was no aim of Langdell or Ames to forsake moral educa-
tion.225 There is no reason to believe that their own aims were to ad-
vance the financial well-being of their students or of the legal profession;
to the contrary, their own aspirations appear to have been simply to im-
prove the law by separating it from politics. Although their efforts on
that score were at best only partly successful, the systematic study of
reported cases advocated by them as a teaching device was and is a useful
method for the inculcation of public virtue. This is so because case dis-
cussion, at least if conducted as Langdell envisioned, forces the imper-
sonal weighing and balancing of competing values to resolve particular
problems.226 It develops reasoning to persuade a public audience and
habits of analysis rooted in the general public interest. Rewarded is the
ability to think disinterestedly about highly contentious matters; pun-
ished is the passionate insistence on one's own idiosyncratic values or
interests, or adherence to abstract theory yielding unwelcome results in
225. Cf Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 460-61 (1897) (To
facilitate the learning and understanding of the law, one must view it as separate from morality.
Law is not "a deduction from principles of ethics or admitted axioms or what not," but rather
"prophecies of what the courts will do in fact.").
226. For a review of the costs and benefits of this mode of teaching, see Carrington, supra note
202, at 489-91.
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application. Passions are disciplined. Students experiencing a heavy
dose of such instruction are changed by it, and in some ways, they are
made more fit for public responsibility. This is more likely to be true if
the judicial opinions that are the grist of discussion reflect the American
judicial tradition, or the Grand Manner, that displays balanced consider-
ation of first principles than is the case where the opinions available to be
studied manifest a crabbed formalism unduly attentive to the flyspecks in
legal texts.
D. Academization
As technocratic professionalism engulfed modem society, there de-
veloped in the increasingly prosperous universities a meta-profession of
those sustaining the learning from which the status of the professions
derived. By 1890, the academic profession had taken on an independent
life in America, taking forms established in Germany. Academicians be-
gan to transform law teaching.
The development of the full-time, career law teacher has likely had a
significant effect on law teaching as moral education. The most obvious
consequence was apparent at the outset, the creation of distance between
law teachers and the institutions and relationships that comprise the law.
For some, this distance is benign because it facilitates disinterest.
Those actively engaged in public affairs, as most law teachers were in the
first century, acquire intellectual and moral baggage that can be an im-
pediment to detached evaluation of the public good that is the discipline
of republican virtue. Francis Lieber boasted that he "belonged to no
party" when teaching, 227 and well he may not have, but such virtue is not
easily maintained by one who is a partisan when not teaching. Such ten-
sion is less likely to arise when the teacher's involvement is judicial, as it
generally was, but even judges acquire intellectual investments in their
decisions that encumber their consideration of interests and values in
conffict with those decisions. The professional academic may be less en-
cumbered in this way. Not least among the reasons that this is so was
the emergence of academic freedom and tenure, providing job security
for law teachers uttering thoughts unwelcome to those in power.228
227. FRANCIS LIEBER, THE ANCIENT AND THE MODERN TEACHER OF POLITICS 12 (1860); see
also Letter from Francis Lieber to Oscar Lieber, in LIEBER, supra note 179, at 313.
228. Two highly developed features of the German tradition of-academic freedom that presented
two sometimes conflicting visions were the lehrnfreiheit, the individual professor as autonomous and
subject to the control of no hierarchy, and Freiheit der Wissenschaft, the freedom of the faculty to
govern itself. See generally Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Aca-
demic Freedom in America, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1265, 1269-71 (1988).
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There are many examples of law teachers who have exploited the
opportunity afforded by the academic environment to achieve a high
level of virtuous disinterest in their writing while rooting it in concern for
practical consequences. As an examplar whose work has lately resur-
faced, Harry Kalven comes to mind. Living virtually his entire life in the
academic environment of Hyde Park, this "least doctrinaire of men" 229
devoted his career to "severe questioning of the things he loved best,"230
ever mistrustful of his own generalizations and of all theory.2 31
On the other hand, an excess of distance from real affairs can
weaken the law teacher's judgment about public affairs. The discipline of
republican virtue entails consideration of real public interests realistically
evaluated;232 persons who lack experience in public affairs may have
greater difficulty in leading students to make mature assessments of those
realities. It is not without cause that academic life is often spoken of as a
cloister.
No better example of a sheltered intellect can be found than James
Barr Ames, who was the first pure academician to teach law at Harvard.
Ames was employed to teach law immediately after completing the re-
quirements for his degree, and devoted his entire career to teaching in the
Harvard cloister.233 There is no doubt that he was a stimulating class-
room teacher and a man of consummate virtue, loved and admired by
both students and colleagues. One of my own teachers, Austin Scott,
who was a student of Ames, paid Ames a very high compliment in 1955
when he said to me and others that he had not felt the need for a course
in professional ethics because he had known James Barr Ames.
Nevertheless, despite his many admirable qualities, Ames must be
reckoned a man of deplorable judgment on issues of public import. I
offer three examples. First, as a teacher of Civil Procedure, he empha-
sized the Hilary Rules as sound law that his students should master. The
Hilary Rules had been adopted in England in 1834 and quickly repealed
in 1848 because they made unrealistic demands on the skill and informa-
tion of counsel and produced much injustice.2 34 He held out as a model
229. HARRY KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA xxii (Jamie
Kalven ed., 1988).
230. Id. (characterization attributed to Ramsey Clark).
231. See id at xvi.
232. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Gov-
ernment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18-19 (1986).
233. SUTHERLAND, supra note 82, at 184.
234. See generally W.S. Holdsworth, The New Rules of Pleading of the Hilary Term, 1834, 1
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 261 (1923).
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of good professionalism the late Baron Parke,235 who was said to have
boasted of his ability to decide cases under the Hilary Rules without
reaching the substantive merits, and who on that account was ridiculed
by later judicial law reformers.
Second, Dean Ames also often taught Negotiable Instruments. He
did not learn of the existence of the Commission on Uniform State Laws,
an important national institution established in 1890, until its efforts had
resulted in the adoption of its Negotiable Instruments Law by four states,
a reform of considerable advantage to banks and others dealing regularly
in commercial paper and imposing no apparent disadvantage on anyone.
On learning of this development, Ames set to the task of derailing adop-
tion of the Law in other states, arguing to legislatures that it would be
better to allow the case law in the area to "work itself pure" over a few
more decades of litigation.236 His argument was unpersuasive to almost
everyone who heard it.237
Third, while Dean, Ames was asked to approve the appointment of
his colleague, Joseph Beale, as a visitor to help found the University of
Chicago Law School. At the time, a most distinguished member of the
Chicago faculty was Ernst Freund, a political scientist highly regarded
for his writing on the subject of Legislation. Ames conditioned his ap-
proval of Beale's visit on a requirement that Freund not be permitted to
teach in the new law school, lest Chicago students be poisoned with the
unprofessional insights of this admirable scholar. Beale made the visit,
and Freund was permitted to teach law students, while Ames had mean-
while demonstrated a preposterous ambition to impose intellectual isola-
tion on law students.238
Thus, for all of his admirable attributes, Ames may stand as a para-
digm of the legal scholar who failed to ground his work in reality and
who devoted his career to a romance with ideas that did not work. His
were the "brilliant" ideas unsuited to the real experience of ordinary peo-
ple.239 That later observers perceived this to be a general problem with
235. Ames's admiration for Parke was recorded by Louis Brandeis. See ALPHEUS T. MASON,
BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 37 (1946). For a ridiculing of Parke, see Seijeant Hayes, Crogate's
Case: A Dialogue in the Shades on Special Pleading Reform, quoted and discussed in Holdsworth,
supra note 234, at 271-73.
236. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 82, at 212-13. For Ames's initial argument against the Law,
see James B. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 14 HARV. L. REV. 241 (1900).
237. The Negotiable Instruments Law was the Commissioners' first effort and its most successful
before the Uniform Commercial Code. It was adopted in every state. JAMES WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 3 (3d ed. 1988).
238. See FRANK L. ELLSWORTH, LAW ON THE MIDWAY 68-73 (1977).
239. Cf Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986) (arguing
that brilliant, paradigm-shifting legal theories are generally useless and false).
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academic law was a major impetus to the development of clinical law
teaching in the 1970s.240
In addition to creating the distance between law teachers and the
actual world of law that produced this type of thinking, the academiza-
tion of the law teacher can also have the effect of redirecting interest and
energy. Much of the modern American university's tradition and ideol-
ogy is centered on the German institutions of the graduate school and the
Ph.D. degree. German ideas about higher education arrived in Cam-
bridge with the return of George Ticknor and Edward Everett in 1819.241
It reached apogee with the founding of the graduate school at Johns
Hopkins University in 1876.242 It emphasized intellectual specialization,
hierarchical preoccupation with status, pursuit of abstraction, and with-
drawal from concerns with the practical applications of learning.
An effect of the rising status of the academic profession on law has
been to socialize law teachers to these, and perhaps other, academic val-
ues. By 1920, it was already questionable whether some law professors
were teaching law, or perhaps pursuing some other discipline. By 1980,
that was no longer a question, for it was clear that many had opted for a
different professional identity than lawyer and had as academics chosen
to pursue inquiries a considerable distance removed from law. As Fran-
cis Allen has put it,243 the academically elite law school is increasingly a
colonial outpost of the graduate school, dominated by persons whose pri-
mary interests are in almost any other discipline than law.244
As Charles Collier has recently observed in the pages of this Jour-
nal, academization is readily observed in the titles of articles published in
distinguished periodicals. 245 Little of today's legal scholarship resembles
Brandeis and Warren on The Law of Ponds, Beale on Tickets, or Willis-
ton on Successive Promises of the Same Performance.246 Contemporary
240. See generally William Pincus, The Clinical Component of University Professional Education,
32 OHIO ST. L.J. 283 (1971). For current comment, see Barnhizer, supra note 207. It is not clear
that clinical education has served this purpose. To the contrary, it may have excused non-clinical
law teachers from the burdens of concern for practical reality by enabling them to leave that to the
clinicians.
241. See VAN W. BROOKS, THE FLOWERING OF NEW ENGLAND: 1815-1865, at 89-104 (1936).
242. The academic profession first gained its distinct identity with the establishment of the grad-
uate school and the Ph.D. degree at Hopkins. See HUGH HAWKINS, PIONEER: A HISTORY OF THE
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, 1874-1889, at 81, 122-24 (1960). These innovations had appeared at
the University of Berlin in the post-Napoleonic era.
243. See Francis A. Allen, The Dolphin and the Peasant: Ill-Tempered, but Brief, Comments on
Legal Scholarship, in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN E.
CRIBBET 183, 184-85 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988).
244. See Arthur A. LefF, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978).
245. See Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining the
Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 DUKE L.J. 191, 196 (1991).
246. See id. at 198.
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work is much longer, more heavily documented, and much more prone
to pursue any intellectual trails leading into other professional literatures.
Almost a parody is the new journal very recently announced, Law &, a
scholarly publication that will publish papers on any topic as long as the
paper is not limited to law.247
The consequences of this reorientation of law teachers on moral ed-
ucation is not clear.248 Interdisciplinary interest that is not too far re-
moved from the realities that are the law's proper concern relieves the
intellectual isolation created by the technocratic impulse that infected it,
and provides an opportunity for the rediscovery of the relationship of law
to all learning that bears on the culture of which it is a part. Such
broader learning, exemplified in the work of Kalven and others, is the
proper domain of public persons and would have been welcomed by Jef-
ferson, Wythe, and Lieber, and especially by David Hoffman.249 Yet
there is a difference between the broad range of inquiry appropriate to
public decisionmaking and academic discourse. Where the virtuous pub-
lic person is a consumer of usable information that can be applied to this
day's decision, the true academic is a creator of information with limited
regard for its utility except to other truthseekers. Thus, even in its inter-
disciplinary aspect, the academization of law presents some tension with
the mission of law teaching. 250 The scholar's truth competes with the
citizen's virtue as a sovereign value for law teaching, perhaps as much as
does the aim of the lawyer's competence.
This competition is manifested in a tendency of the academic profes-
sion to glory in the worldly irrelevance of its deepest insights. 251 "To-
day," we are told, "everyone is talking about theory. '25 2 In this, the
Prussianized American academic profession sometimes seems to be an
247. The announcement brochure was distributed in February 1992 by the University of South-
er California Law School.
248. For other assessments, see Francis A. Allen, Legal Scholarship: Present Status and Future
Prospects, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 403 (1983); David Barnhizer, The University Ideal and the American
Law School, 42 RUTGERS L. REv. 109 (1989); Philip C. Kissam, The Decline of Law School Profes-
sionalism, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 251 (1986); Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal
Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835 (1988).
249. Cf DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY RESPECTFULLY ADDRESSED TO THE
STUDENTS OF LAW IN THE UNrrIED STATES 32-33 (1817) (recommending that a course of study of
the law include a broad range of subjects, including moral and political philosophy).
250. For an expression of the glib assumption that the academic enterprise necessarily reinforces
good teaching, see Carrington, supra note 29, at 406-11. For a recent review of the problem, see
Marin R. Scordato, The Dualist Model of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 367
(1990).
251. For an expression by an American lawyer that "metaphysics" is "the highest wisdom," and
therefore the first aim of higher education, see ROBERT M. HUTCHINS, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN
AMERICA 98 (1936).
252. Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1 (1986).
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almost perfect complement to the English legal profession, which is said
to glory in its aversion to theory.253 Academic pursuit of abstraction
may be not merely a digression from pragmatic concerns, but may some-
times be associated with a tendency to intellectual effort that is ideologi-
cally dogmatic and hence harmful to the pursuit of republican virtue.
Ideological dogmatism can result from inattention to the messy details
that so often distress theory. But public virtue, like God, is in the details;
sweeping statements like some of those made here are seldom the means
for finding the common ground that resolves public issues with results
that fairly evaluate competing interests and thereby save the whole. To
write this article, for example, may be deemed something less than an act
of public virtue: What is more theoretical than to decry theory?
In any case, it seems that where the line of American law teachers
following Wythe have taught pragmatism, those recently following intel-
lectual trails into economics or the humanities seem often to manifest a
disinclination to that mode of thought.25 4 Increasingly partisan dogma-
tism is evident in the American academy today,255 and may now be af-
fecting law teaching. Although moral education can proceed from a
considerable range of partisan commitments, republican virtue is criti-
cally impaired by partisanship that makes severe moral judgments about
rival views.256 The effect of the intolerance of contemporary "political
correctness" on the willingness or ability of students to practice the traits
of virtue is uncertain, but seems unpromising. Strong is the contrast with
the Wythe tradition.
There is yet another hazard in academization. By creating distance
between the law teacher and the realities of law, it can increase the effec-
tive distance between teacher and student. A teacher who is seen by stu-
dents to be disengaged from political reality and the humdrum affairs of
professional life may be disadvantaged in the effort to inculcate moral
standards applicable to professional thinking and conduct in public roles.
Thus, a professor of literary or economic theory, however able, will not
be a professional role model for novice public lawyers, however much the
professor manifests the appropriate intellective skills.
253. See PATRICK S. ATIYAH, PRAGMATISM AND THEORY IN ENGLISH LAW 3 (1987).
254. Professor Collier seems an example of one who is reconciled to the absence of worldly
consequence to the institutional pursuits he favors. See Collier, supra note 245, at 271-72.
255. For a brief description of the phenomenon, see John Searle, The Storm over the University,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 6, 1990, at 34. For a broadside, see DINESH D'SouzA, ILLIBERAL EDUCA-
TION (1991).
256. Cf Michael I. Swygert, Striving to Make Great Lawyers-Citizenship and Moral Responsi-
bility: A Jurisprudence for Law Teaching, 30 B.C. L. REv. 803, 820 (1989) ("A moral perspective
looks with hope to the future without being overly judgmental about the past.").
V/ol. 41:741]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
If the founders of 1992 choose to inculcate republican virtue in aca-
demic institutions in order to stabilize democratic politics, they will need
to achieve a proper balance between theory and practice. As Jefferson
envisioned, a university law school has an exceptional opportunity to
bridge the worlds of ideas and affairs, supporting traffic in both directions
to bring academic thought into contact with reality and practical govern-
ance into contact with disinterested inquiry, with benefits flowing in both
directions. 2 57 Such a bridge requires footings at either end, but there
seems to be some operative law of physics that causes the one end or the
other of such bridges to become dismoored. It is therefore a major chal-
lenge of contemporary founders who would train public leaders in aca-
demic institutions to engineer the prevention of that effect.
E. Other External Influences
These four impulses from abroad do not exhaust the list of those
that have influenced American law teaching. World War II was an enor-
mous social force. Jim Crow may well have died on the battlefields of
Europe, for the struggle against Nazism carried a strong message to the
victors regarding race relations. Segregation would surely have faded in
time in any case, but its demise was hastened by the increased intolerance
of most Americans for the southern tradition of racial oppression. The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was an expression of that development and thus,
in part, a reaction against Hitler.
Law schools were predictably receptive to the inclusion of African-
American and women students, and, after 1964, their numbers increased
rapidly.2 58 But it would be unjust to claim this effect as the product of
law school policies. Although law schools played a role by exercising
their newly acquired gatekeeping functions to provide more minority
lawyers, the opening of the legal profession to minorities and women was
chiefly a triumph of American culture, a prevailing of the spirit of the
Declaration of Independence. It was more a product of the teaching of
George Wythe than of the efforts of any law leaders living in the twenti-
eth century.
It also seems that the Vietnam War was a manifestation of another
current having significant effects on American culture and hence on
American law teaching. It is too soon to judge how that influence will
play out, but the alienation and hostility that the war and related events
engendered in many young Americans can now be seen to abide in the
257. I am confident that this metaphor comes from Karl Llewellyn, but I have not found the
source.
258. Data is published annually by the American Bar Association Section on Legal Education
and Admissions to the Bar.
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literary efforts of some middle-aged law teachers. To the extent that the
moral education favored by Wythe and his descendants entailed moral
commitment to public institutions, law teaching in America may have
declined in quality as a result of the alienation caused by those external
events.
Meanwhile, despite these numerous travails, it is at least possible
that American university education in law is still performing the mission
that was assigned to it by Thomas Jefferson and others, most fully articu-
lated by Francis Lieber, and performed by George Wythe, his students at
Transylvania, Joseph Story, and now countless others. If so, law teach-
ers are to that degree exercising the influence through their students that
the Revolutionaries intended them to exert. But that influence is mani-
festly subordinate to the great winds of change that circumnavigate the
planet; like Lorenz's butterflies, law teachers may make a difference, but
we are foolish to think that the world awaits the direction of law teachers
in matters of political morality.
VI. THE LAW TEACHER AS PUBLIC PERSON
A second means by which American law teachers may influence the
course of law and public affairs is through direct public or political activ-
ity. In their public activities, law professors act as individual citizens.
The means to influence open to law professors are mostly the same as
those open to non-academic lawyers or, in some cases, laypersons. In
some circumstances, law teachers may have an edge derived from their
professional status and from the "contacts" acquired through their
alumni and former students, but this is not always so. In some circum-
stances, to be an academician is an impediment to gaining attention.
These opportunities for service include political activity at the local,
state, and federal levels; work with the organized bar or other organiza-
tions having a stake and an active program of involvement in public af-
fairs; consultation with local, state, and federal legislative bodies; and
professional service advocating causes before all manner of forums. An
appointment to an American law faculty is a license to engage in all of
these activities on one's own terms, provided one can earn a welcome in
the appropriate precincts.
There are disincentives to participation in such activities. To ac-
quire the welcome essential to be useful, it is often necessary to associate
on friendly terms with persons who are not always of sufficient status to
confer honor on those who associate with them. One must go to meet-
ings and not only talk, but also listen politely, often more than once to
the same bad idea. One must study and think about issues and problems
that are of immediate concern to others, and not only those issues most
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attractive to one's own interests. The issues to be addressed are often
distastefully narrow. To be effective, one must compromise and accom-
modate. One must repeat one's self. One must risk the sting of visible
defeat. To secure the best opportunities, one must sometimes first win
trust by bearing the most unwelcome burdens, performing prosaic tasks
that do less honor to one's talents than one might wish, for, alas, to be an
admiral in law and politics, one must generally spend some time in the
boiler rooms of legal and political institutions.
For the most part, however, those individual American law profes-
sors who have in the twentieth century influenced the development of
American law have not been daunted by these disincentives and have
achieved influence at least partly by these conventional means open to
all. By such common means more than a few law professors have ef-
fected change in the law. Others have secured high judicial or other pub-
lic office where they performed virtuous service. By their labors, they
may also have incidentally transmitted to other lawyers and to their stu-
dents the moral message that the concerned Revolutionaries of the eight-
eenth century would have us learn regarding the need for disinterested
public service. Many have taught public morality by example.
This source of influence of American legal education on the law has
been significant. It is, however, threatened by both late nineteenth-cen-
tury pursuits of the investor's human capital and of the scholar's truth.
Technocratic law and the financial rewards associated with large invest-
ments in professional education can be a threat to the participation of
law teachers in public affairs if professors, like some students, become
chiefly engaged in maximizing their marginal revenue in lieu of pursuing
the common good as private ministers without portfolio. Endangered in
American universities is the example of Louis Pasteur who applied his
science to a series of public problems without leaving the main themes of
his work or becoming "consultant to silkworm growers, wine makers,
brewers, or poultry men. '2 59 Income maximization by law professors
may also infect the public with mistrust of motives: Law professors who
sell the trademark of their universities to express in a court or other fo-
rums professional opinions agreeable to those who pay for them endan-
ger both the repute and the reality of academic disinterest. Those
academic lawyers who establish regular relations with clients or firms
sacrifice disinterest and thereby diminish their ability to perform the pub-
lic mission to which Jefferson and Wythe called them.26°
259. ABRAHAM FLEXNER, UNIvERsmES: AMERICAN, ENGLISH, GERMAN 132 (1930).
260. Cf Bruce A. Ackerman, The Marketplace of Ideas, 90 YALE L. J. 1131 (1981) (urging law
schools to avoid compromising their integrity as scholarly communities by refusing to publish "party
commissioned scholarship" in their law reviews).
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Likewise, academization threatens the public role of the law teacher,
but in quite different ways. Involvement in public affairs fits poorly with
the reward systems of the academic profession. The disincentives to pub-
lic involvement that I enumerated may be especially unattractive to gen-
uinely academic persons. It is also possible that persons who select
themselves to be fully committed to the more purely academic profession
and its values are less suited to public activities and thus unlikely to enjoy
much success in any event. There does seem at times to be, as Woodrow
Wilson observed, a "perennial misunderstanding between men who write
and men who act."'261
For these reasons, there is but little room in the American academy
today for the likes of the judge-teachers of the past. It is indeed not
certain that the influence achieved by such law teachers in their roles as
public persons can or will be maintained by their successors; possibly
American law teachers will in time be as withdrawn from public affairs
as their English counterparts. Any founders of 1992 who seek to incul-
cate standards of conduct suitable for democratic leadership may there-
fore question whether there are not better ways to link those teaching law
to the contemporary concerns of public life.
VII. THE INFLUENCE OF ACADEMIC LITERATURE ON AMERICAN
LAW
The third possibility for influence is through academic authorship.
Academic literature played a very small role indeed in the formative first
century of American law. William Blackstone had an influence on the
American legal profession almost contrary to his purpose in writing, for
his work was used chiefly to enable untrained persons to perform legal
services. 262 St. George Tucker's contribution in editing Blackstone was
substantial. James Kent's Commentaries on American Law263 were un-
deniably influential, at least in the formation of American property law.
Parts of the extended work of Justice Joseph Story264 may have influ-
enced his brethren on the Court. George Sharswood of the University of
Pennsylvania wrote a widely read work on professional ethics. 265 Simon
261. NICHOLAS J. DEMERATH ET AL., POWER, PRESIDENTS, AND PROFESSORS 27 (1967).
262. See JAMES W. HuRST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 256-57
(1950); Dennis R. Nolan, Sir illiam Blackstone and the New American Republic" A Study of Intel-
lectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 731 (1976).
263. KENT, supra note 96.
264. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES (1832).
265. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1854).
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Greenleaf's Evidence 266 was read by lawyers and judges across the coun-
try, and was cited by more than a few courts. Of these authors, only
Tucker and Greenleaf can be counted as genuine academicians. While
writing at Columbia, Kent's relation to the university was nominal, and
the impact of his work derived largely from his decades-long role as the
intellectual leader of the highest court in the most important state, New
York. The work of Justice Story, although written at Harvard while
Story was lecturing regularly, can also be largely discounted for similar
reasons. The authority of Sharswood's work derived largely from his
prominence as a judge and public figure. Any of these works if written
by a genuinely academic author might well have achieved unmarked
obscurity.
George Wythe, the greatest teacher, made no contribution at all to
academic literature. George Robertson, the most important teacher at
Transylvania, wrote little267 other than judicial opinions, and his work is
now long forgotten. Professor Timothy Walker of the University of Cin-
cinnati wrote an excellent one-volume work on American law that saw
six antebellum editions.2 68 It was addressed to a lay audience, and
although useful had no visible influence on the development of the law.
The most intellectually ambitious body of work on American law in the
era before the Civil War was the work of Francis Lieber.269 Although
much of his work was widely read and admired by men such as Kent and
Story, it is difficult to trace any consequence to his work until he served
actively in the War Department during the Civil War. There, he was the
author of General Orders 100, controlling the conduct of Union troops in
occupied territory, an Order adopted in the same words by the Prussian
army in 1870, and adopted in 1907 by a Hague Convention as the inter-
national law of war.270 In this role, he was a person of large and genuine
influence, not only on the events of his own time, but of our own as
well-as manifested by the world reaction to the mistreatment of prison-
ers taken in 1991.
266. SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1848). The thirteenth edi-
tion of this work appeared in 1876.
267. See GEORGE ROBERTSON, SCRAP BOOK ON LAW AND POLITICS, MEN AND TIMES (1855).
268. TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW (1837). The eleventh edition of
this work appeared in 1905.
269. See FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS (1880); FRANCIS LIEBER,
ON CIVIL LIBERTIES AND SELF-GOVERNMENT (1874); FRANCIS LIEBER, PROPERTY AND LABOR
(1840). Lieber can be said to have been the first American scholar of law-and-economics and also
the first -of law-and-literary criticism.
270. See generally FREIDEL, supra note 178; ELIHU ROOT, ADDRESSES ON INTERNATIONAL
SUBJECTS 89-103 (1916).
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One academic author possibly having a material influence on legal
thought in antebellum America was Thomas Cooper, sometime Presi-
dent of the University of South Carolina I27 1 and immediate predecessor
to Francis Lieber. Cooper was in his youth "an English Jacobin. '272 Af-
ter coming to America, he served a prison term for sedition against Presi-
dent Adams, published books on chemistry, bankruptcy law, libel law,
and political economy, and edited the American edition of Justinian.273
He also earned the condemnation of Daniel Webster as the "School-
master of Slavery," for he was thought to be the author or chief propaga-
tor of the rationalization that slavery is a necessary condition of a free
society.274 Cooper's theory (if indeed it was his) was that an underclass
is inevitable, and the preservation of republican freedom for the overclass
depends on effective control and nurture of that inevitable underclass, a
condition maintainable over time only by means of the institution of slav-
ery. This thesis was assuredly heard on the lips of many an antebellum
politician. Cooper's possible importance as a source of this theory illus-
trates how academic authors can be "influential" by uttering theory that
is congenial to their cultures.
As noted, there was at the outset of the second century of American
law a major shift in theory and method animated by both the post-War
search for order and the global impulse to technocracy. To attribute that
moment of formalism to the efforts of positivist legal theoreticians such
as Ames would deny the effects of the overwhelming cultural force that
underlay the development. The most that might be conceded is that the
moment was a bit longer on account of their efforts.
Indeed, the Langdell "scientific" theory of law was never accepted
by thoughtful contemporaries. 275  Not even Ames's colleagues at
Harvard, James Bradley Thayer 276 and especially John Chipman
Gray,277 were seriously infected by the momentary spirit of formalism.
Formalism was bitterly denounced by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, in
271. See generally MALONE, supra note 99.
272. Id. at 34-72.
273. Id. at 119-36, 211-47.
274. The idea had solid English origins dating from 1701. See TIsE, supra note 148, at 97-123.
275. See, eg., Report of the Committee on Legal Education, 15 REP. A.B.A. 317 (1892). Lang-
dell's fate in this respect was much the same as that of the Sophist, Protagoras, who purported to
teach a science of politics, but whose discipline was in time recognized as lacking substance. See
Robert R. Bolgar, Training of Elites in Greek Education, in GOVERNING ELITES: STUDIES IN
TRAINING AND SELECTION, supra note 77, at 38-40.
276. See, eg., James B. Thayer, Law and Logic, 14 HARv. L. REV. 139 (1900). In an earlier
work, Thayer went so far as to contend that constitutional rights reside primarily in the culture, not
in legal texts, nor in the powers of the judiciary. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
277. See JOHN C. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW (1910).
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1897.278 It seems not to have impeded the avowedly politicized efforts of
Cooley at the University of Michigan, a judge-professor cut in the ante-
bellum mold, whose work on American Constitutional Law was widely
cited by the Supreme Court,279 albeit at times in support of decisions in
which he might not have concurred. And assuredly the moment did not
control the early-twentieth-century teaching of Eugene Gilmore at the
University of Wisconsin, a committed political Progressive, 280 whose
ideas became the Legal Realism of Columbia and Yale a few decades
later.2 1 Nor did it seem to bear on the work of the California Progres-
sives who founded the School of Jurisprudence at Berkeley. 28 2 By the
time of Roscoe Pound's deanship in 1915, the moment of apolitical for-
malism was in full retreat.283 He was appointed as dean despite a senti-
ment he owned about his colleagues' teaching that would do honor to
contemporary radicals, and incidentally reflected his exaggerated concep-
tion of the influence of American law teaching:
[T]he conflict between our law and those who are working for social
progress has its roots ultimately in our teaching of the law.... [I]t is
278. See Holmes, supra note 225.
279. American academicians have seldom been subject to the monstrous discourtesy of being
treated as unworthy of judicial attention. One never needed to die to be cited. See DAWSON, supra
note 26, at 97.
280. For a chronicle of Progressivism and the politics of the times, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER,
THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955). The Progressive Movement was in some
respects a renewal of the democratic impulse, an effort to engage the people actively in governing at
all levels.
281. Gilmore's interests spanned environmental law, criminology, and law-and-economics. For
an expression of his views, see Eugene Gilmore, Some Criticisms of Legal Education, 7 A.B.A. J. 227
(1921). For an account of his role in the founding of the American Law Institute, see N.E.H. Hull,
Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Institute, 8 LAW &
HIsT. RV. 55, 67-70 (1990). Underhill Moore, Ernest Lorenzen, and Walter Wheeler Cook were
junior associates of Gilmore's at Wisconsin. On the subsequent careers of this trio at Yale, see
LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986); John H. Schlegel, American Legal
Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 Burr. L. REV. 459 (1979). For
an account of the movement in which they had earlier engaged at Columbia, see Brainerd Currie,
The Materials of Law Study, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1955).
282. See generally Sandra P. Epstein, Law at Berkeley: The History of Boalt Hall (1979) (un-
published Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Berkeley).
283. In retreat, it may have attracted some overreactions, exemplified by the expression of radi-
cal "realist" views such as those suggesting that judges stop publishing opinions. See, e.g., Joseph
W. Bingham, What Is the Law?, 11 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1912); see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Ameri-
can Jurisprudence Between the Wars: Legal Realism and the Crisis of Democratic Theory, 75 AM.
HisT. REv. 424, 434-35 (1969) (noting some commentators' opinions that judges' deciding law re-
sults in government of men rather than law or even in tyranny or despotism).
[Vol. 41:741
BUTTERFLY EFFECTS
not recall of judges or recall of judicial decisions that should be in-
voked, but rather recall of law teachers, or at least recall of a great deal
of law teaching. 284
The moment of formalism probably gave heart to the efforts of great
academic treatise writers: Wigmore, Williston, Scott, and a few others.
But even these worthy scholars were seldom deceived by antiseptic for-
malism. Their work was, as intended, useful to courts and lawyers in
comprehending whole fields of American private law that had never
before been synthesized. Some judicial users of such works may have
treated them in a formal way, much as an English court might have
treated a Parliamentary enactment. But the authors were not so inno-
cent as to suppose an absence of political content in their work, except
insofar as they, as virtuous citizens of the republic, eschewed
partisanship.
Just as Langdell and Ames can scarcely be credited or blamed for
the moment of formalism, so its demise can scarcely be attributed to the
literary efforts of Roscoe Pound, Karl Llewellyn, and other academics. 285
It was only a moment, a mere sand bar in the course of a great river,
destined to be swept downstream at the next rising of the current. Pound
and Llewellyn, however they may have seen themselves, were less the
cause than the manifestation of its disappearance.
As it happens, both Pound and Llewellyn had more consequential
work to perform, Pound as one of the most influential judicial law re-
formers of the twentieth century,286 and Llewellyn as the draftsman of
the Uniform Commercial Code.2 87 Although each produced academic
literature associated with his reform endeavors, much of it could have
been regarded by the most elite academic standards as more pedestrian
than Pound's writings on Sociological Jurisprudence288 or Llewellyn's on
Legal Realism. 289 On the other hand, Llewellyn especially came to see
his own legal theory as essentially anti-general, anti-ideological, even
284. Roscoe Pound, Taught Law, PROC. ASS'N AM. L. ScHs., Aug. 26, 27, 1912, at 55, 60; see
also Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUc 222 (1984); Peter W. Martin, 'Of
the Law and the River.' and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1985).
285. Cf John P. Dawson, Legal Realism and Legal Scholarship, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 406, 407
(1983). Atiyah and Summers are cautious, but seem to attach more consequence to the corrective
writing of the Realists than circumstances warrant. See ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 251-
52.
286. See PAUL SAYRE, THE LIFE OF ROSCOE POUND (1948).
287. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 237, at 3-6.
288. See, eg., ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1954); Ros-
coe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908).
289. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REv. 1222 (1931).
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anti-theoretical. 290 In this, he manifested a kinship with earlier Ameri-
can legal pragmatists such as Jefferson and the antebellum law teachers.
No sooner did legal academic writing appear in America than it be-
came an additional source of authority for judicial decisions that needed
to be explained to a doubting public. But such citation was often use, not
influence. One must generally express thoughts agreeable to authority,
as Cooley, for example, often did, to merit frequent citation. To take a
more recent example, Richard Marcus has pointed to an admirable arti-
cle by Abram Chayes as much cited because it struck a welcome note;291
whether its content actually influenced events seems very dubious.292
American courts had long cited almost anything to justify their deci-
sions, and social science data were soon to be used in the same way.293
But academic argument or analysis, or even stubborn data,2 94 leading to
an unwelcome conclusion is likely to be ignored by judges when engaged
in self-justification. Legislative committees and administrative agencies
often use academic work in much the same way.
Still influential are treatise writers who provide structure for the
thinking of lawyers and judges about legal doctrine. The structure they
provide enables legal discourse to proceed more effectively. But many,
perhaps most, contemporary treatises are written by lawyers, not acade-
micians. Unlike the classical private law treatises, most find their subject
and their structure in legislation, and serve to synthesize judicial exegesis
of legislation. This is very useful work, and the person who does it earns
and receives a measure of influence with judges and lawyers. Seldom,
however, is this form of influence now achieved by the academic elite,295
who tend to scorn such humdrum work, 296 and some of whom seem even
to have concluded that the opinions of politically uncongenial judges less
290. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE (1970).
291. See Richard Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
647, 648 (1988) (citing Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1976)).
292. See id.
293. Louis Brandeis filed his historic data-filled brief in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (1908).
This may be taken as a sign that in that year Brandeis believed that the sitting Justices recognized
their political responsibility and were interested in the social consequences of their decisions.
294. See DONALD L. HORowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); see also Paul D.
Carrington, Foreword: The Scientific Study of Legal Institutions, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Sum-
mer 1988, at 1.
295. See A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the
Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 632 (1981). Excellent counterexamples include AR-
THUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND DEATH (1972);
GEORGE E. PALMER, RESTITUTON (1980); CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1969).
296. See, ag., HERBERT L. PACKER & THOMAS EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDU-
CATION 32 (1972).
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lettered than themselves are unworthy of close attention. 297 Although
this may be a corrective for an excessive preoccupation with the work of
judges that may have characterized academic writing in the past,298 it
marks as well a surrender of potential political influence. One hears too
infrequently today Harry Kalven's repeatedly uttered reminder that aca-
demic work is "so much easier and less responsible" than is that of men
and women who are obligated to decide.2 99
An example of the influence of academic writing is provided by the
development of American tort law. There has been much academic writ-
ing on the subject in the twentieth century and tort law has evolved sub-
stantially over that time. Whether the change in the law is the
consequence of the excellent, pungent academic writing done by persons
such as Leon Green30° seems doubtful.30 1 Surely a bigger factor has been
the political activity of labor unions, trial lawyers, and others who am-
plify the stark fact that American law made in the nineteenth century
was in twentieth-century minds appallingly inconsiderate of accident vic-
tims. One did not need to read Green to see that something had to be
done. On the other hand, in order to do something about the law of
torts, it helped for the professor to become a Justice, as Professor Roger
Traynor did.3 0 2
What was in fact done to the law of torts may be no credit to any-
one, for we have designed a monstrously expensive system of compensa-
tion that benefits lawyers more than victims. It is unlikely in the extreme
that any other nation would wittingly adopt American tort law. Profes-
sors Robert Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell, as academic ministers with-
out portfolios, have led an assault on thai system.30 3 To the extent that
they have been effective, it has been because they have worked within the
297. For another view of the continuing importance of the "unity of discourse" between law
teachers and judges, see Rubin, supra note 248, at 1859-65.
298. Cf Graham Hughes, The Great American Legal Scholarship Bazaar, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC.
424,427 (1983); Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cures, 90 YALE L.J. 1205 (1981).
299. See KALVEN, supra note 229, at xxiv.
300. See, ag., LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930); LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXI-
MATE CAUSE (1927); LEON GREEN, TRAFFIC VICTIMS, TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958); cf G.
Edward White, The Impact of Legal Science on Tort Law 1890-1910, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 213
(1978).
301. But see George Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intel-
lectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985). Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
. 302. As a Justice of the Supreme Court of California, Roger Traynor played a significant role in
the transformation of American tort law. It is perverse to contend that Traynor's judicial efforts are
a manifestation of academic influence. See ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 402.
303. See ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965); cf Stephen D.
Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 555 (1985).
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political system. Their academic literary product was an expression of
direct political initiatives and seldom burdened their readers with theo-
retical exegesis.
It is, however, for legal academics an unwelcome reality that there is
often a choice to be made between work that can and may be applied
usefully to current public issues and work that is intellectually more am-
bitious, more personally gratifying, and more likely to win recognition
among academicians. For scholars who write literature not confronting
in practical terms issues of current concern to persons making decisions,
their certain fate is to be ignored by those whom they ignore.3°4
Although the relationship is far from exact, it may be true within
the operative limits that intellectual ambition and political influence are
negative correlates. This is so because persons who make public deci-
sions often welcome authoritative advice on narrower issues that can be
resolved with little concern for broad social and political values, but are
seldom influenced by the politics or philosophies of academics, or even of
their law clerks fresh from the academy. The possibility that much aca-
demically fashionable interdisciplinary legal scholarship will ever find ap-
plication in the corridors of power seems remote. Those working in the
stratosphere of economic theories of law, or who debate the congruence
of constitutional doctrine with classical political theory, or who decon-
struct such discourses, have made a choice to remove themselves for at
least a time from the arena in which direct influence on real events is
possible. As Tocqueville observed in this very context: "The world is
not led by long or learned demonstrations: a rapid glance at particular
incidents, the daily study of the fleeting passions of the multitude, the
accidents of time, and the art of turning them to account, decide all its
affairs." 30 5
For this reason, theorizing about law is perhaps the activity of law
professors least likely to bear on the course of events; abstraction is often
the enemy of influence.30 6 Perhaps political inconsequentiality is the ulti-
mate fate of all philosophy. But it is in any case true for America and
presumably for other legally constrained democracies that large public
decisions are seldom strongly influenced by legal theory. Broad precepts
are almost always subordinated to the practical considerations that con-
trol decisionmaking in such polities. Indeed, for America it is true that
304. See Louis J. Sirico & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing ofLaw Reviews by the Supreme Court:
An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986).
305. 2 TOCQUEViLLE, supra note 66, at 43.
306. Cf. H.F. Jolowicz, Utility and Elegance in Civil Law Studies, 65 LAW Q. REv. 322 (1949);
Farber, supra note 239, at 917 (arguing that "'paradigm shifting' work should be abandoned in
favor of the more pedestrian activity of 'normal science' ").
[Vol. 41:741
BUTTERFLY EFFECTS
our complex constitutional structure was designed to prevent the polit-
ical implementation of great dogmas that may from time to time hold
sway over the minds of those with fleeting power. 307. In this American
condition, much public decisionmaking must inevitably be fact-bound
and compromised. Theoretical coherence is not a plausible expectation.
Other complex unions and commonwealths that seek in 1992 to
cabin politics by law may consider the implications of this observation in
planning the training of lawyers to staff their governance. A course
worth considering is to seek legal scholarship having more limited sights,
more like those set with increasing frequency in contemporary science.30 8
Until recently, the badge of sovereignty in the hierarchy of science (like
that of academic law) has been work of transcendent abstraction. Such
work is now less likely to be regarded as "cutting edge" stuff. Rising in
science is an appreciation of work that rediscovers reality in the homely
details of familiar natural occurrences. Increasingly fashionable in sci-
ence is preoccupation with minor disorders in data, especially older data
that bear on functions and relations long deemed orderly. Data ignored
or discounted as irregularities of measurement are now being re-ex-
amined to see if there are not smaller patterns previously unnoticed by
scientists bent on testing larger hypotheses.
In this vein, the political and educational founders of 1992 might
seek law teaching that attends not merely to the legal texts generated by
our effusive governments, but also to empirical research. As Caleb Foote
observed some years ago, American law teaching has oscillated between
fanaticism and failure in the employment of empirical methods. 309 Few
law teachers are themselves competent to engage in such work310 except
at the most prosaic levels, 311 yet many are quite competent if assisted by
an empiricist or two. Such work not only often requires collaboration, 312
but is generally labor-intensive. It tends to require a degree of benign
acceptance of the basic political structure and premises that one aims to
reform; thus, Harry Kalven sounded a useful note of caution in explain-
ing the numerous large scale failures in empirical work:
307. Tocqueville observed Americans to be generally preoccupied with instances and averse to
theory. 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 66, at 411.
308. See GLEICK, supra note 7, at 35-63.
309. See Caleb Foote, The Law and Behavioral Science Project at the University of Pennsylvania:
Family and Criminal Law, 11 J. LEGAL EDUC. 80, 81 (1958).
310. See Franklin E. Zimring, Where Do the New Scholars Learn New Scholarship?, 33 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 453 (1983).
311. See, eg., Paul D. Carrington, United States Appeals: A Field and Statistical Study, 11
Hous. L. Rtv. 1101 (1974).
312. This need was apparently the source of Lon Fuller's opposition to "project" research. See
Robert S. Summers, Fuller on Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 8 (1984).
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[T]hese were heroic prospectuses by men who were in flight from
law, who were out to revolutionize it. And they started with the prem-
ise that anything must be better than what we have now. The vision
was, you know, large and generous, a sort of crusade to bring finally a
little sense into the priesthood that we are all in. In brief, these were
calls for a revolution of law. And, of course, that approach has two
great diciulties. The first is it obviously alienates everybody else in
the field, as they are quick to indicate. The second and more serious is
that it is fundamentally wrong; it is a view that denies the considerable
wisdom and sense and rationality of the legal system as it now is.313
But even among those who have observed this caution and designed
projects, as Kalven urged, that were reformist and not radical in their
premises, the rate of failure among American legal empiricists has been
high.314 Indeed, some contemporary empiricists seem to despair of the
enterprise of measuring the effects of legal institutions as an activity too
lacking in "transformative" effects to merit the effort required; hence,
they seek a "post-modem" empiricism unburdened of the noisome con-
nection of science to reality.315 On the other hand, if conceived to influ-
ence decisions of others, with appropriate modesty of ambition, empirical
work can achieve its aim.316 Yet no one should proceed down that path
unwarned, 317 for it, too, presents perils of irrelevance. 318
In any case, as Jefferson emphasized, times of political crisis and
renewal call not for elegance of theory but practicality of judgment; not
for expressions of natural law or justice or other elevated abstractions,
but for compromises that work. To be effective in helping to erect demo-
cratic legal systems, law teachers should be encouraged to forsake the
cloister at times to dig in the soil of popular politics that they may know
313. Harry Kalven, Some Comments on the Law and Behavioral Science Project at the University
of Pennsylvania, 11 J. LEGAL EDUC. 94, 95 (1958).
314. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763 (1986);
Schlegel, supra note 281; John H. Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science:
The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFF. L. REv. 195 (1980).
315. See David M. Trubek & John Esser, Critical Empiricism in American Legal Studies" Para-
dox, Program or Pandora's Box, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 3 (1989); Austin Sarat, Off to Meet the
Wizard: Beyond Validity and Reliability in the Search for a Post-empiricist Sociology of Law, 15
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 155 (1990).
316. David Chambers's work offers a sterling recent example. See DAVID CHAMBERS, MAKING
FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT (1979); see also Paul D. Carrington, Fore-
word: The Scientific Study of Legal Institutions, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1988, at 1.
317. For a current treatment of the relationship of social science to legal theory, see DONALD
BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE (1989). For a review citing the self-appraisals of empiricists work-
ing on law, see Austin Sarat, Donald Black Discovers Legal Realism: From Pure Science to Policy
Science in the Sociology of Law, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 765 (1989).
318. But see George Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as
University, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437 (1983). Before justifying the expense entailed by Professor
Priest's proposals, law teachers must demonstrate a far greater utility to their research than can
presently be claimed.
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the competing moral claims to be reconciled, and so that they may ade-
quately reflect the cultures of which their institutions are to be a part.
The reader will recognize pretentiousness in presuming to utter such
a call for modesty of aspiration among those founding or revitalizing in-
stitutions of legal education in 1992. Just as there is irony in posing an
educational theory against theory, so there is pretense in calling attention
to the pretenses of others. Nevertheless, such a call seems worth uttering
even to American colleagues, some of whom may be ready to despair of
cosmology. Yet it would be unwise to expect much change: It is doubtful
whether many law teachers could return to the farm of prosaic legal
problems after seeing the vast city of philosophy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
University legal education has a special but modest place in many of
the new governments now being established. That place will be specific
to each culture to be governed, but at this time, the possibilities and the
American experience merit thought in many places.
Whichever of the three means law teachers may be directed or per-
mitted to employ to influence the law and the culture that creates them,
it is important to know that the enterprise is as speculative as that of the
forester whose plantings will become trees or not largely as a conse-
quence of forces and events completely beyond her control, most of them
occurring long after she has retired from the scene. It is unlikely in the
extreme that a mere law teacher will have an effect on the main currents
of any law or culture that are materially greater than Professor Lorenz's
Brazilian butterfly, and she would have about the same chance of fore-
casting what any such effect might be. What Learned Hand said of pro-
fessional work in law abides:
We are the workers in the hive; we shall not be missed, nor shall we be
able to point at the end to any perceptible contribution. But the hive
goes on, an entity, a living thing, a form, a reality. So far as we cannot
severally sink our fate in its fate, we shall not have our reward.319
Perhaps that is well. Whether the world would be improved if indi-
vidual law professors really were affecting many large political results
may itself be a large question. Would there be credit received or blame
borne? It should be a comfort to most of us that even Nietzche bears
neither credit nor blame for the twentieth century, but was merely a
product of his time and place.
319. LEARNED HAND, To Yale Law Graduates, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND AD-
DRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 84, 89 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1952).
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